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Promotion Incentives and Teacher Effort in China 
Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the effort incentives of teachers in rural China.  China 
employs a complex system of annual evaluations and promotions for civil servants 
in which good evaluations, along with a teacher's years of service and education, 
make teachers eligible to apply for rank promotions.  A model of promotions is 
developed in which agents are both incentivized, and are sorted into ranks by 
ability.  The model's predictions are then tested using panel data on teachers 
collected as part of the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF).  We find that 
teachers respond to promotion incentives as predicted by the model: salary 
differentials are used to motivate teachers to work harder and teachers do work 
hard for promotions; teachers that are repeatedly passed over for promotions tend 
to slack off, as do teachers that have been doing well in the past; increased 
competition in the form of more teachers increases incentives when the probability 
of promotion is between 1/3 and 2/3; and effort is low when the probability of 
promotion is close to zero or one. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 The centrality of teachers to the learning process is well established (Glewwe, 2002).  
However, in many low income countries, teachers' incentives are weak, as evidenced in part by 
extremely high absence rates and by low student performance.  Most often, teachers are paid based 
on their experience and education rather than on their performance.  This phenomenon has led to 
increased interest in incentivizing teachers with the hope that it will have a positive effect on 
teacher effort and on student achievement.  As a result, there has recently been a push towards 
studying and implementing performance pay systems, both in the developed world (particularly in 
the United States) as well as in low income countries.  Incentivizing teachers is generally framed in 
the context of performance pay (bonuses), and is often based on annual evaluations.  However, the 
use of performance pay for teachers is not widespread, particularly in the developing world.  At the 
moment, promotions remain the primary source of incentives for teachers in many contexts.  It is 
important, therefore, to study the impact of such systems on teachers' effort.     
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 There has been a debate in the literature on the merits of incentives through performance 
pay (bonuses) versus promotions.  The literature has shown that performance pay systems are 
susceptible to gaming and influence activities (Figlio & Kenny, 2006).  However, a seminal paper by 
Baker, Jensen and Murphy argues that, 'promotion-based incentive schemes have many 
disadvantages and few advantages relative to bonus-based incentive schemes' (Baker, Jensen and 
Murphy, 1988, p. 600).  Specifically, they argue that managers may have an incentive to manipulate 
the promotion system by accepting bribes.  So, perhaps promotions should be used for sorting of 
employees and bonuses should be used for incentives.  However, as Fairburn and Malcolmson 
(2001) argue, promotions can actually overcome the disadvantages noted by Baker, Jensen and 
Murphy, as a bonus system is also susceptible to influence activities, but a promotion system can be 
made incentive compatible.  They note that, 'as long as managerial rewards are tied in some way to 
the short term performance of the section for which the manager is responsible, the manager has an 
interest in ensuring that the appropriate employees are promoted' (Fairburn and Malcolmson, 2001, 
p. 46).  If this is the case, then perhaps the focus on performance pay for teachers is unwarranted, 
and implementing an optimal promotion system would elicit more effort from teachers.  This paper 
will use the case of China to study features of its promotion system, and will attempt to glean which 
features work well, and which ones do not work as well. 
  China's bureaucratic system is unique for a low-income country, in that civil servants enter 
the government at an entry-level position and then compete with their colleagues for promotions.  
This is also the case for teachers in China.  Each school has an allocation of ranks set by the district 
education authority (which come with increasing salary levels) and teachers must compete for 
positions at higher levels based on their education, experience and annual evaluation scores.  
Bonuses are not awarded to teachers, and as such, promotions are the main source of incentives.  
Furthermore, the promotion system for civil servants in China is a very sophisticated one and thus 
provides an excellent opportunity to study this topic. 
 This paper will study the effects of this evaluation and promotion system on teacher effort in 
Gansu province in rural China.  In particular, it will focus on the effects of time after promotion for 
various rank levels, as well as on measures of competition and ability.  We will do this by first 
developing a model based on that of Gibbs (1989), that models promotions as having both a sorting 
and incentivizing function.  We then test the predictions of the model using panel data obtained 
from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF).  We measure effort using the teachers' 
reported annual evaluation scores for the years 2003-2006.  We use a teacher fixed effects 
specification with dummies for the number of years after promotion, and we include various 
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measures of competition and ability.   We find that the predictions of the model are largely 
corroborated: promotions are indeed used to motivate effort and that teachers do work hard for 
promotions; teachers that are repeatedly passed over for promotions tend to slack off, as do 
teachers that have been doing well in the past; increased competition in the form of more teachers 
increases incentives when the promotion rate is between 1/3 and 2/3; and effort is low when the 
probability of promotion is close to zero or one. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  The following section will outline some previous work on 
this topic, and Section III will detail the theoretical model.  Section IV will explain the data as well as 
the rationale behind the study, and Section V will present the empirical specifications used for the 
tests, as well as some potential concerns with the estimation strategy.  Section VI will present the 
results of the econometric tests, and Section VII will conclude. 
2.  Related Literature 
 
 This section provides the context for this research.  It outlines previous research and findings 
and describes how this paper will build on them. There are three strands of literature related to this 
study: the literature on motivating and incentivizing teachers, the literature concerning education 
and in particular teachers in China, and the labour economics literature that studies promotions as 
incentives through both theoretical models and empirical evidence. 
 
Teacher Incentives 
 The studies on teacher incentives carried out thus far focus on performance pay and have 
investigated the impacts of both individual and group incentive schemes on student outcomes and 
on teacher attendance.  They attempt to glean whether basing pay on performance, or on closer 
monitoring, or both, leads to increased effort on the part of teachers, as measured by student 
outcomes.  They point to positive gains in both respects, however, they also uncover gaming 
behaviour in some cases.   
 Lavy (2002) and Lavy (2003) study a group incentive program and an individual incentive pay 
program, respectively, in Israel.  Lavy documents improved student achievement in both as a result 
of the schemes.  Glewwe et al (2003) undertake a randomized study in Kenya involving group 
incentives, and find that student test scores do indeed improve, but that teacher effort may suffer in 
other dimensions, as teachers were found to be 'teaching to the test'.  Duflo and Hanna (2005) also 
undertake a randomized trial by installing tamper-proof cameras in Indian schools, coupled with 
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high-powered financial incentives based on reported attendance of teachers.  They find that 
attendance improved significantly, as did student achievement.  Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
(2009) study a randomized trial with both a group and an individual incentive pay scheme based on 
student test scores in Andhra Pradesh, India.  They find that the incentivized schools outperform the 
control schools, and that the individual incentive treatment group outperformed the group incentive 
treatment group. 
 Numerous studies have also been carried out in the US.  Figlio and Kenny (2006) consider 
individual incentives, and report positive effects on student achievement.  However, their data is 
cross-sectional.  Other studies in the US have pointed to evidence of gaming, particularly, teaching 
to the test, providing high calorie lunches on test days, and placing certain students in special 
education classes to raise average scores (Figlio and Winicki, 2002; Figlio and Getzler, 2002; Jacob 
and Levitt, 2003).  Thus, studying the various responses to incentives is important. 
Teachers in China 
 A number of papers have used the GSCF data to study various aspects of the education 
system in China, including education management, financing and decentralization, school 
attainment, and educational resources (see GSCF website).  Park and Hannum (2001) study the 
effects of educational inputs on student achievement in Gansu province, particularly, teachers as an 
input.  They use teacher rank titles as a proxy for teacher quality, as they are meant to measure 
several dimensions of teacher ability, performance and effort.  They find that teacher quality is 
extremely important, particularly for language scores of students.   
 Ding and Lehrer (2001) examine the evaluation and pay system in Jiangsu province in China.  
They present a model of a performance measure that combines both objective and subjective 
elements, and test the model empirically.  They find that teacher salaries are positively related to 
both objective and subjective performance measures, that salaries increase with rank, and that 
teachers that are male, more educated, older, and have more education, tend to be in higher ranks.  
However, this work does not study the effort incentives from the evaluations and promotions.  
Promotions as Incentives 
 The theoretical and empirical literature related to this study is concerned with the internal 
labour market of firms.  This literature regards promotions as having two functions: to sort 
employees by ability, and to provide incentives for effort.  The idea of promotions as an incentive 
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device is closely linked to the theory of tournaments1.  Tournament theory states that a firm can 
motivate employees by having them compete for a reward (a promotion) (Gibbs, 1994).  
Tournament models of promotion take Lazear and Rosen's (1981) rank-order tournament model as 
their starting point.  Here, two players compete for a promotion (which implies an increase in wages) 
and only the person with the higher output wins it.  In their model, effort is unobservable and output 
depends on effort and a random component.  They show that there exists a wage gap that will 
induce the first-best level of effort.  Other papers that study promotion tournaments include 
Malcolmson (1984), Rosen (1986), and Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988).   
 The literature on sorting of employees into ranks or jobs is based on Sattinger (1975), Rosen 
(1982) and Waldman (1984), as well as MacLeod and Malcolmson (1988).  In these models, a job 
ladder is generated endogenously within the firm.  MacLeod and Malcolmson (1988) present a 
promotion model in which ability (which varies across employees) and effort are private 
information.  The firm sets up an internal labour market with different ranks and higher wages at 
higher ranks.  There is a distribution of ability types a and effort levels e.  Disutility of effort is lower 
with higher ability ( c(e)/a ).  The model predicts that employees will sort into ranks according to 
ability; the people that get promoted are those for which their ability justifies their effort for 
working hard and being promoted.  People with higher ability work also harder to get the next 
promotion.   
 Fairburn and Malcolmson (1994) model a case where the firm would like to sort employees 
into different jobs.  They note that it is generally a manager who reports on employees' performance 
and recommends bonuses, and that these managers may be susceptible to 'influence activities' on 
the part of employees that may make the promotions inefficient in the sense that more employees 
could be promoted than would be optimal.  However, if promotions are used in conjunction with 
bonuses to sort employees into different jobs, then even when influence is possible, effort will be 
increased2.  Papers that study promotions as sorting devices highlight either learning or human 
capital acquisition as the way of adding dynamics to the promotion process (Gibbons and Waldman, 
1999).   
                                                          
1
 There are two other strands of literature related to incentives. The first is that related to agency models and 
incentive contracting as developed by Mirrlees (1974, 1976), Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom (1999) and Shavell 
(1979) which focus on the tradeoffs between risk and incentives.  The efficient contract involves providing the 
employee with a bonus to elicit optimal effort.  The second is the efficiency wage approach in which the firm 
elicits effort by paying a wage that is above the market-clearing level and threatening to fire the employee if 
he/she exhibits performance that is too low (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). 
2
 Many other papers study various incentives of managers, including Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts 
(1988), and Prendergast and Topel (1996).   
6 
 
 Gibbs' (1989) extends the Lazear and Rosen (1981) basic tournament model to multi-person 
tournaments, and incorporates the use of an internal hierarchy in the firm to sort employees 
according to ability.  The paper shows that in a multi-person tournament with heterogeneous agents 
competing for a series of promotions, employees with higher ability tend to be promoted, so 
employees sort into ranks according to ability, and that promotions can provide both efficient 
sorting and effort incentives.  Furthermore, the number of competitors and the distribution of skills 
amongst employees, as well as the wage differentials at different ranks, all have an important 
influence on effort incentives.  We will return to this model in the theory section.  Gibbs' model is 
expounded in two further papers, Gibbs (1990) which compares tournaments and standards, and 
Gibbs (1991) which details more carefully the incentive effects for employees with  varying ability.   
 Early empirical studies of tournaments used data from auto racing and chicken farming, 
rather than compensation and firm level data.  Empirical studies of  tournaments take the approach 
of testing tournament theory versus other wage theories such as marginal productivity, to see which 
one holds for the data (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994b; Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Medoff 
and Abraham, 1981).  The log of the wage is generally used as the outcome variable.  For example, 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993) use personnel data from a large firm in the US with multiple 
levels in the hierarchy and regress rank titles on wages.  They find that the ranks explain 70% of 
variation in wages, and that individuals experience larger wage increases with promotions.  They use 
this as evidence that the firm uses promotions as incentives.  However, the effect of those incentives 
on effort is not studied.  Much empirical evidence on tournament theory also focuses on CEO pay as 
a way to test tournament theory as the wage gap at the top level is expected to be large (Bognanno, 
2001).   
 However, these studies do not include a performance measure in their estimations and as a 
result, they do not get at effort incentives.  Furthermore, their studies focus on middle-level 
managers, generally in the US, in the private sector.  Gibbs (1995) uses the same personnel data as 
Baker et. al. (1993) along with performance ratings, and focuses on middle managers.  He finds that 
both promotions and bonuses are used as incentives in this firm, and that employees that are 
repeatedly passed over for promotion have greatly reduced incentives.  Campbell (2008) is one of 
few studies that looks at non-financial performance measures.  He studies managers of a fast food 
outlet, and he finds that these non-financial measures do indeed factor into promotion decisions.  
Furthermore, he provides evidence that promotion incentives affect behaviour; stronger incentives 
lead to greater improvements in qualitative performance indicators.  Kwon (2006) studies effort in 
human capital accumulation but focuses on women at lower levels, and again in a private-sector 
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setting.  In this paper, we focus on effort incentives rather than on testing tournaments, and look 
specifically at effort incentives over time and in response to various measures of competition.  
Furthermore, our setting is the public sector in a low-income country.  We are unaware of any other 
such studies.  The next section will outline the theoretical model that the data will be used to test.  
3.  A Model of Promotions as Incentives 
 
This section will detail a model of promotions as incentives.  The following exposition is 
based primarily on Gibbs (1990) as well as on Gibbs (1989) and partially on Gibbs (1991).  Teachers 
differ in terms of skill/ability, s.  Teachers contribute effort to their job (this includes diligence, care 
etc., not just hours), but effort is costly and gives them disutility C(e) which is increasing in e at an 
increasing rate so that C' and C'' ≥ 0.  The school would like to both motivate effort and to sort 
employees by ability.  The performance measure is q = s + e + η where q can be thought of as 
teaching output (student learning, growth as individuals, etc.) and η is measurement error, which we 
assume has a symmetric distribution around a single mode of zero3. 
A teacher's probability of being promoted depends on his/her skill and chosen effort, but the 
teacher does not know his/her s relative to that of others, nor does he/she know the school's 
estimate of his/her s, so beliefs on s are important.  We assume that a teacher's subjective beliefs 
about s are characterized by a symmetric, unimodal distribution with mean   .    is a function of the 
teacher's information about performance in previous periods and varies across teachers.  Thus, to 
the teacher, there are two types of luck: the actual value of s relative to   (i.e. s -   ) and the 
measurement error η.  Define the combined luck as θ = s -   + η so that q =   + e + θ and define ε =   
+ θ4 so now q = e + ε.  Denote the CDF and PDF of ε as F(ε) and f(ε) respectively.  Given the previous 
assumptions, θ is symmetric and unimodal at   if s and η are independent.   
A teacher's probability of promotion can be written as p = p(  , e, e) where e is a vector of 
other teachers' efforts.  Without loss of generality we can assume that the average value of   across 
teachers is zero, and   can be interpreted as the teacher's best guess about his/her skill relative to 
the average teacher in his/her rank, so E(ε) = 0.  The school offers a benefit/reward from promotion, 
ΔEU, which is the change in expected lifetime utility gained from winning a promotion relative to not 
being promoted (this could be in the form (W2 - W1), different wages at different ranks where W2 > 
W1 if rank 2 is higher than rank 1, but could also include non-pecuniary benefits).   
                                                          
3
 Since the error that arises from measuring a teacher's performance is the sum of many sources of error, this 
assumption seems reasonable (Gibbs, 1989). 
4
 In this way, skill becomes part of the luck draw. 
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The teacher chooses effort to maximize the expected reward minus the disutility of effort: 
   
 
                       (1) 
The first order condition sets the marginal cost of effort equal to the gain in utility, times the 
marginal effect of effort on the probability of promotion: 
        
         
  
        (2) 
Gibbs terms 
  
  
 the marginal probability of effort (MPE).  As (2) shows, incentives depend on two 
things: ΔEU and 
  
  
, the sensitivity of the probability of promotion to changes in effort.  The larger 
the prize (ΔEU) the greater the incentives.  The second order condition is satisfied as long as the 
probability function does not exhibit too large increasing returns to effort: 
  0   )e(C" - EU
e
p
  *
2
2


     (3) 
In order to study 
  
  
, the structure of the promotion contest must be specified.  If n teachers 
are competing for a fixed number, k, promotion slots, then this is a tournament structure.  The 
probability of promotion (which is the same as the promotion rate here) is p = k/n.  Equilibrium 
effort e* depends on the actions of other teachers.  To win a promotion, the teacher must place kth 
or higher, so he/she must beat at least n-k co-workers in pair-wise comparisons of output. 
The probability that teacher i beats teacher g is p(qi > qg) = p(ei + εi > eg + εg) = p(εg > ei - eg + 
εi) = F(ei - eg + εi).  Since no teacher knows his/her skill relative to that of other teachers, a symmetric 
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is appropriate and optimal effort for all teachers is e*.  The probability that 
teacher i beats any other teacher is F(ei - e* + εi) and the probability that teacher i loses to any 
opponent is 1 - F(ei - e* + εi).  To finish j
th from the top out of n teachers, one must beat n - j teachers 
and lose to j - 1 teachers.  The probability of doing so for any given partition of competitors, 
conditional on i's luck εi is: 
pr(place jth out of n | εi) =  
   
   
  F(ei - e* + εi)
n - j 1 - F(ei - e* + εi)
j - 1. 
The probability of promotion conditional on εi is the sum of the conditional probabilities of 
placing first through kth.  Integrating out εi gives the unconditional probability of promotion: 
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where the subscript i has  been dropped for notational convenience.  If p = 0 or 1 (k = 0 or n) so that 
either everyone or no-one is promoted, then p(  , e, e) is constant and the MPE and incentives are 
zero.  Nobody has an incentive to work. 
To solve for the MPE we need to differentiate with respect to e and substitute in the 
symmetric NE condition ei = e*.  After rearranging, we have: 
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Now we can analyze 
  
  
.  A teacher is trying to beat the n - k - 1st order statistic (the random 
variable that is the n - k - 1st score (from the bottom) among competitors).  Denote this order 
statistic τ.  Subtracting off optimal effort of competitors gives the luck ε required to win, λ = τ - e*.  
With a symmetric NE effort terms cancel out and λ is also an order statistic, the n - k - 1st (from the 
bottom) among the n - 1 competitors.  Let this random variable have CDF G(λ) and PDF g(λ).  For any 
given luck ε, the probability of promotion equals: 
). +e -G(e  =  ) |  +e >  +p(e  =  ) |  >  +p(e  =  ) | dpr(promote
**   
Integrating over the luck distribution provides the unconditional probability of promotion, 
p = G(e-e*+)f()d4where the integrand except for f(ε) is an order statistic density.  This shows 
that the MPE is independent of equilibrium effort; it depends only on k and n.  We can simplify (4) by 
making use of change of variables ψ  F(). Since fd = dF = dψ, and  = F-1(ψ) we can write: 
  .))d(Ff(  )-(1 
k -n
1 -n
k) -(n    =  
e
p 1 -1 -k1 -k -n 








 
This integrand, except for f(F-1(ψ)), has the form of a Beta density function (k,n-k)5.  Thus, 
ψhas the effect of a Beta-distributed random variable and  
  ))(Ff(  E  =  
e
p 1 - 


.     (5) 
                                                          
5
 Order statistics of the uniform distribution on the unit interval have marginal distributions of the Beta 
distribution family. 
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When f(ε) is symmetric and unimodal at 0 then f(F-1(ψ)) is symmetric over [0, 1], unimodal at 
1/2 and f(F-1(1/2)) = f(0). 
 Gibbs then provides a number of propositions and predictions using properties of Beta 
densities, some of which we summarize here, providing the intuition.  The most relevant property of 
Beta densities is as follows:  (k, n-k) is symmetric about one half for k ≥ 1 if and only if k = 1/2n 
(when half of the teachers are promoted).   (k, n-k) is skewed to the right if k > 1/2n, is skewed to 
the left if k < 1/2n, and becomes increasingly skewed as k/n deviates from 1/2 in either direction.  
The intuition is that when more than half are promoted, the distribution gets skewed to the right.  
Higher values of luck are more likely so you do not need to work as hard to get a promotion (you are 
likely to just get lucky) so MPE is lower.  When less than half are promoted, the distribution gets 
skewed to the left.  Lower values of luck are more likely so your effort has less bearing on the 
probability of promotion (you are likely to just be unlucky) so MPE is lower here too.  This will be 
useful for the results below.  Figure 3.1 below illustrates.  Panel A is for p = k/n = 1/2, Panel B is p > 
1/2 and Panel C is p < 1/2. 
 
Figure 3.1 
 
Panel A: p = 1/2   Panel B: p > 1/2   Panel C: p < 1/2 
 
We can see from (5) that because f(0) = max(f), the marginal probability always has an upper 
bound that is determined by the distribution of the measurement error (ε).  If  ~ N(0,2), then 
p/e  (22)-½.  As 2 gets larger, the upper bound of the MPE decreases.  The more noise, the less 
impact effort has on the probability of being promoted (the density gets flatter so extreme values of 
good/bad luck are more likely).  In the standard two-person tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) 
increasing noise leads to lower incentives.  However, here in the multi-person tournament, 
incentives are only lowered if p=1/2.  If p≠1/2 then increasing noise may increase incentives by 
increasing p/e depending on the combination of k and n (it may not get flatter).  The further p 
diverges from 1/2, the more extreme values of luck become important as it takes more good or bad 
ψ ψ 
ψ 
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luck to win or lose.  In these cases, increasing the variance of ε makes winning or losing based on luck 
more likely so that marginal effort has more effect on the probability of winning. 
Another proposition states that if less than half are promoted (p<1/2) and if another person 
is added to the contest (n+1 contestants instead of n) leaving k fixed, then effort is less likely to affect 
your chances of promotion (p/e will be lower) since p will be even further from 1/2 (bad luck will 
be even more likely).  If exactly half are promoted (p=1/2) then adding another person leaves effort 
just as likely to affect your chances of promotion.  If more than half get promoted (p>1/2) then 
adding another person means effort is more likely to affect your chances of promotion.  Intuitively, as 
promotion becomes more or less likely (p approaches 0 or 1), more extreme good or bad luck is 
needed to win or lose the promotion.   
An important result is Gibbs' proposition 5: When f is symmetric and unimodal, adding one 
more winner (k+1 instead of k winners) while keeping the number of contestants, n, the same, 
increases the MPE for k<1/2(n-1), keeps the MPE the same for k=1/2(n-1), and decreases it for 
k>1/2(n-1), a special case of which is k=1/2n or p=1/2.  If less than half of people get promoted, then 
adding another winner will increase the effect of effort on your probability of promotion as bad luck 
is more likely but less so now (p will be closer to 1/2), and the reverse is true for more than half being 
promoted (p will be further from 1/2).  In sum then, holding the prize fixed, incentives rise as the 
probability of promotion, p, rises from 0 to 1/2, incentives peak at p=1/2, and incentives decrease 
as p rises from 1/2 to 1.  The model predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between incentives 
and probability of promotion.  Intuitively, if the probability of 
promotion is exactly half, a teacher is on the margin of being 
promoted versus not being promoted.  It is in this case that 
effort is most likely to affect the probability of promotion, and 
incentives are sharpest.  Thus, any change in k or n that brings 
p closer to 1/2 causes incentives to increase.  In addition, the 
effect on incentives is symmetric with respect to | p - 1/2 |, 
the absolute difference of the promotion rate to 1/2.  Thus if p 
is very high or very low we can expect very low effort. 
Returning to the effects of the number of competitors, we obtain another prediction.  
Increasing the number of contestants, n, keeping the probability of promotion k/n fixed, raises the 
MPE if p=1/2 (the graph gets taller), and generally does so for middle values of p as well (between 
1/3 and 2/3).  For values of p closer to 0 or 1, increasing n lowers the MPE.  This is more likely to hold 
if f has greater variance or if the contest size is smaller.  The greater the number of contestants, the 
 
           1/2 
Probability of Promotion (p) 
 
M
P
E 
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smaller the variance in the order statistic that must be beaten to win a promotion.  For cases where p 
is further from 1/2, smaller amounts of luck are more likely to affect who wins and since these are 
the more likely values of ε effort has a larger effect on the probability of promotion.   
Another prediction of the model is that there is a positive relationship between salary 
differentials between levels and |p - 1/2|.  The difference in salary will be higher for promotion rates 
closer to zero or one.  We can test for this here.  For example, promotion rates to Primary high level 
and Middle high level (the highest levels that can be attained) are quite small so we would expect the 
salary differential at these levels to be large.  Finally,  for promotion rates closer to 1/2, larger  groups 
will tend to have smaller rewards.  After achieving the final promotion, we can expect effort to cease 
- since there are no more promotions, there is no incentive for effort.   
Thus far, we have assumed homogeneity in beliefs about skills.  This framework can be 
extended by introducing heterogeneity in beliefs about skills.  We will consider four ways of doing 
this.  First, consider a case where a teacher believes that his/her probability of promotion differs 
from 1/2 based on their beliefs about their skill relative to others.  If a teacher believes they are far 
ahead or far behind the 1 - pth ability percentile of their peers, their incentives are lower than a 
teacher that believes he/she is at the margin.  This is because those far ahead do not need to put in 
as much effort to achieve the same objective, and those that believe they are far behind may believe 
that their effort will not affect their chances of promotion.  So for those that believe that they are of 
very high or low ability, effort may be lower.  Another extension is promotions over multiple periods.  
Often, as is the case here, there are several years between promotions, and promotions can occur at 
a number of these years.  The more a teacher is passed over for promotion, the more heterogeneity 
in skill beliefs increases.  A teacher that has not been promoted updates his/her beliefs on skill 
(downwards) relative to others in that rank, and also tends to be older and thus enjoy additional 
earnings from promotion for fewer periods.  These teachers would be expected to have lower 
incentives the longer they stay in a rank.   
Third, there are generally multiple promotions in a promotion hierarchy, and future 
promotions also provide an incentive for effort for lower rank levels as well.  Workers at later stages 
of their career also have better knowledge about their talents and this means that promotions would 
tend to be spaced further apart later on in a teacher's career.  Finally, if promotion is based on 
previous performance as well (in our case the requirement is to achieve one 'excellent' or two 'good' 
evaluations6 to be eligible to apply for a rank promotion), this would also provide the teacher with 
information about his/her relative skill and this dampens incentives.  A teacher that has been doing 
                                                          
6
 The evaluations are on a four point scale: 1 = fail, 2 = pass, 3 = good, 4 = excellent. 
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well would tend to slack off.  For a worker that has been promoted, he/she knows that his/her skill 
level is higher than those that were not promoted.  However, this is true for all those that were 
promoted so the teacher does not know his/her skill relative to the new cohort of teachers at this 
higher rank.  In this way, sorting of teachers by ability is achieved and incentives for effort are 
maintained, even after promotion (Gibbs, 1991).  
We expect, then, that effort incentives depend on timing.  In the period leading up to the 
time of promotions, it is unclear as to whether teachers would have an incentive to increase or to 
reduce effort.  It may depend on the teachers' beliefs as to whether earlier or more recent 
evaluations feature more or equally in the promotion decision.  This may also vary by school and 
depend on the principal's preferences.  It is possible that during this period, all teachers would have 
similar incentives for effort, but later on, once some evaluation scores have been accumulated, there 
may be more dispersion in effort as teachers are then aware of what they need in order to secure a 
promotion.  During the key promotion period, we would expect effort to be high if promotions are 
indeed a source of incentives.  After this key promotion period, we would expect effort levels to 
drop.  This could be because of the reasons discussed above, that a teacher would update his/her 
beliefs on ability relative to others, or it could be because a teacher believes that principals just do 
not promote after a certain amount of time has passed, or because a teacher just does not want to 
apply for a promotion.  
Since beliefs about skill are very important to how a teacher may behave, controlling the 
information available to a teacher about his/her performance relative to others can be a powerful 
tool.  The objective for the school is to have a teacher believe that he/she is as close to the margin of 
promotion as possible.  This means that the school has an incentive to have very good teachers 
believe that they are closer to average so that they continue to exert effort, and to have teachers 
that are falling behind also believe the same so that they do not completely give up.  Gibbs notes 
that this is a possible reason for which we often observe evaluation scores that do not vary very 
much.  Furthermore, since incentives drop off more quickly for those falling behind than they do for 
those far ahead, the distribution of evaluation scores tends to be skewed towards more positive 
evaluations (Gibbs, 1991).  The presence of such skewing of evaluation scores would make it more 
difficult to find empirically that promotions increase incentives for effort. 
To summarize, the model predicts the following: 
1. The larger the expected prize (wage differential), the higher will be effort; 
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2. If the probability of promotion, p, is exactly 1/2, then increasing the 'noisiness' of the 
performance measure will lower incentives by lowering the MPE.  If p≠1/2 then increasing 
the noisiness of the performance measure may increase incentives; 
3. If p<1/2 then increasing the size of the pool of competitors will decrease the MPE and 
incentives will be lower.  Incentives remain unchanged if p=1/2 and they increase for p>1/2; 
4. Incentives are sharpest for those that believe they are just on the margin of being promoted, 
vs. not being promoted.  Those farther away from the margin have lower incentives, and 
incentives drop off more quickly for those lagging behind than those farther ahead; 
5. Incentives are ambiguous for the time period  before the key promotion period, are high 
during the key promotion period, and are lower for those that have been passed over for 
promotion; 
6. Promotions tend to be spaced further apart later on in a teacher's career; 
7. Teachers will update their beliefs about their skill relative to others based on previous 
performance measures.  This may reduce incentives; 
8. For values of p between 1/3 and 2/3, increasing the number of contestants while leaving k/n 
fixed increases incentives, and for values of p closer to zero or one, it decreases incentives; 
9. Differences in salary will be higher for promotion rates closer to zero or one; and, 
10. After the highest promotion, effort will cease. 
In the next two sections, we will describe the data used and empiricize this model. 
4.  Data 
 
 This section will briefly describe the data used in this paper and will provide some 
descriptive statistics.  Gansu province is located in a topographically diverse area of North West 
China, and is one of the country's poorest provinces.  As of the year 2000 national census, Gansu 
province had a population of 25.6 million people, 76% of which live in rural areas.  Educational 
attainment is relatively low compared to the rest of China.  By 2000, less than 40% of the population 
had completed primary school, and less than 25% had completed middle school.  School conditions 
and quality vary across the province, however, most principals report that the majority of the 
teachers in their school have the required qualifications (GSCF website). 
 The Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) is a longitudinal study focussing on 
children and education in Gansu province in rural China.  It is the most comprehensive survey on 
education in rural China, and as such, much information is available that would not be in most 
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surveys.  In conjunction with the main child questionnaire, a detailed school survey was carried out 
in each of three waves (2000, 2004 and 2007) that included interviews of the principal at each school 
that the children attended, the child's homeroom teacher, as well as interviews of (in most cases) all 
the teachers at the school.   
 In China, teachers in primary schools can be assigned to four different ranks: Intern, Primary 
level 2, Primary level 1 and Primary high level.  In middle school, teachers also have four ranks: 
Middle level 3 (like Intern), Middle level 2, Middle level 1 and Middle high level.  Each rank 
corresponds to a progressively higher salary, and teachers compete for a limited number of slots for 
promotions.  There are specific rules on the years of service required before a teacher can apply for 
promotion to the next rank level.  All teachers begin as interns in their first year, regardless of 
educational background, and can apply immediately for Primary level 2 or Middle level 2 in the 
second year. Teachers that graduated from a secondary teacher training school can apply for 
Primary level 1 or Middle level 1 after 7 years, and for Primary or Middle high level after 15 years. 
Those graduating from a normal college can apply for Primary level 1 or Middle level 1 after 3 years 
and Primary or Middle high level after 7 years. Those graduating from universities can apply for 
Primary or Middle level 1 after one year and for Primary or Middle high level after 5 years (Park and 
Hannum, 2001).  Promotions are based on meeting some minimum requirements, for example, 
having two 'good' evaluation scores or one 'excellent' evaluation score7, having to wait the 
appropriate number of years before applying to the next rank, and the number of positions available 
at each rank at each school according to the quotas set by the district.   
 We use the third round of data that was collected in 2007, from which a panel was 
constructed for each teacher for the years 2003-2006.  The data set was constructed in this way 
because it was in the third round that data was collected on evaluation scores of all the teachers 
from 2003-2006.  In 2007, individual and household questionnaires, as well as achievement tests, 
were administered to 1500 children aged ten to fifteen in 20 counties in Gansu province.  250 
schools were also surveyed, that included interviews of almost 2500 teachers.  The average sampling 
rate of teachers in the schools is 85% and only 23% of the schools have a sampling rate lower than 
25%.  We only use schools for which the sampling rate is greater than 25%8. 
 Table 1 provides some basic data on the teachers in our sample.  We have data on 2350 
teachers, 40% of whom are female.  The data is broken down by current rank of the teacher.  We see 
that in accordance with the findings of Ding and Lehrer for Jiangsu province, teachers in higher ranks 
                                                          
7
 Evaluations are conducted on a four point scale: excellent, good, pass, and fail. 
8
We lose about 200 teacher observations.  The regressions were also run using only schools with a sampling rate of 50% or 
higher, but the results remained unchanged.  
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tend to be male (the proportion increases sharply over ranks), tend to be older and have more 
teaching experience, and tend to have higher levels of education.  In terms of measures of 'ability', 
the teachers in higher ranks tend to have performed slightly better on their teaching tests 
(education, psychology and language tests, which are taken at the beginning of their teaching 
career), and tend to have received more teaching awards over the course of their career.  A higher 
proportion of higher rank teachers have also published papers on teaching methods in teaching 
journals.  Some of these differences may just be related to the greater number of years of 
experience.  Looking at time use, it seems teachers at lower levels are spending more hours per 
week on grading, lesson plans, and with students.  Again this could be a learning effect; teachers 
that are in higher ranks have been teaching for longer and thus may need to spend less time on such 
tasks.  They also teach slightly fewer classes.  Interestingly, there is quite a sharp decline in the 
Middle high rank, with these teachers putting in the least amount of time on various tasks.  So it 
seems that there is a correlation between rank and teacher ability; better teachers tend to get 
promoted, but the effect on effort remains to be seen, thus providing scope to study teacher effort 
over time. 
 Table 2 provides a breakdown of evaluation scores by rank of the teacher for the years 2003-
2006.  We have four years of data on many teachers, and the total number of teacher-year 
observations is 7,894.  Not many teachers fail, and the majority of the evaluation scores are a score 
of 'pass'.  There also appears to be a curve; the proportions of teachers receiving each type of 
evaluation score remain quite similar across ranks.  Thus, where a teacher falls in the distribution 
may be of particular importance. 
 Figure 1 and Table A1 (in the appendix) look at the number of years until promotion for each 
of the rank levels.  Figure 1 is a set of Kaplan-Meier survival functions for how long a teacher 
'survives' at each rank level.  Each panel is for the number of years from Primary level 2 until 
promotion to Primary level 1, Primary level 1 until promotion to Primary high level etc.  Most people 
that get promoted from Primary level 2 to Primary level 1 do so around 4-5 years after having been 
in Primary 2 rank.  We see that practically everyone is promoted at some point, and that the 
maximum number of years at this level until promotion is 24 years in the sample.  For Primary level 1 
to Primary high level, the distribution in terms of number of years until promotion is far more spread 
out.  There seems to be a steady stream of promotions, but most people get promoted to Primary 
high level between 5 and 11 years after promotion to Primary 1.  Just under 1/3 of Primary 1 
teachers never get promoted to Primary high.  At Middle level 3 rank, every teacher is promoted 
within 9 years, but the majority of promotions appear to be between 2 and 5 years.  At this level, 
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promotion is nearly automatic.  The promotions from Middle 2 to Middle 1 look similar to those of 
Primary 1 to Primary high.  They are more spread out, but the majority occur between 5 and 10 
years.  Approximately 25% of those at Middle level 2 are not (or have not yet been) promoted to 
Middle level 1.  Very few people are promoted from Middle 1 to Middle high level.  In this sample, 
less than 25% have been promoted to Middle high level.  The promotions take considerably longer; 
anywhere above nine years.  Once the teachers reach this level though, as Table 1 demonstrated, 
there may either be a decline in effort, or a learning effect.  Because of the differences in the 
promotion rates and timing across different ranks, this provides a good opportunity to study 
differences in effort due to different promotion rates, as well as to study how effort evolves over 
time. 
 In the next section, we will detail the empirical specification used to test the model of 
promotions as incentives, using the GSCF data. 
5.  Empirical Specification 
 
 The model specified above leads to a number of testable implications.  This section will 
outline how we will test those predictions and will discuss some potential shortfalls of the 
estimation strategy.  The predictions will be tested in three steps: first, a wage regression will be 
used to test whether promotions are used as an incentive device.  Second, we will study effort over 
time, and in response to measures of competition.  Finally, we will look at the determinants of 
promotion to see whether evaluations matter for promotion to gauge whether promotions provide 
effort incentives. 
 We begin by determining whether or not promotions are used as incentives in this data.  We 
do this following the approach of most other studies that have tested promotions as incentives, 
using the log of the wage as the outcome.   We estimate a cross-sectional Mincer-type wage 
regression as follows:  
                   
           (6) 
where w is the wage of teacher i from 2007, α is the constant, R is a set of dummies for each of the 
rank-levels, e is experience and e2 is experience squared, E is a set of dummies for the highest level 
of education that the teacher had achieved in 2007 (primary school, middle school, high school, 
vocational middle school, vocational college, four year degree and graduate school).  If the 
coefficients on the rank dummies are positive and significant (controlling for education and 
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experience), then promotions serve as an incentive device; the ranks explain variation in salary9.  We 
can also use this to investigate prediction 9; to see if there may be sharper incentives with certain 
promotions, i.e. if there are larger salary increases.  We expect the coefficients on the rank dummies 
to be positive and significant, and for the increases in wages to be sharpest for the highest 
promotion rates (Primary 2 to Primary 1, Middle 3 to Middle 2) and the lowest promotion rate 
(Middle 1 to Middle high). 
 We then examine how the system of evaluations and promotions affects teacher effort, 
specifically, we look at how effort changes over time depending on the number of years into a rank 
(prediction 5).  We estimate a teacher fixed-effects regression of the teachers' evaluation scores on 
dummies for the number of years into the rank.  The basic estimating equation is: 
                        (7) 
where eit is the evaluation score of teacher i in time t and proxies for effort, Xit are time-varying 
teacher characteristics, Dit is a set of dummies for the number of years into a rank, ωi is the teacher 
fixed effect, and εit is the time-varying error component
10.  This measures within-teacher variation 
over time, and identification is from teachers that change from one category to another.  Seven sets 
of regressions are run separately, one for each rank (Primary level 2, Primary level 1, Primary high 
level, Middle level 3, Middle level 2, Middle level 1 and Middle high level).  With Primary high level 
and Middle high level we would be able to test prediction 10.  We have a panel of four years of data 
for each teacher (2003-2006).  The dummies are specified for each of the four years in the panel, for 
example, a dummy would be one if for primary 2, 2003 was two years after attaining that rank.  The 
next dummy would be one if for primary 2, 2004 was two years after attaining that rank, and so on 
for each of the possible number of years after promotion, and for each level (the first year after 
promotion is the omitted category).  The coefficients on the dummies will tell us whether effort is 
higher or lower in year x after promotion relative to the first year after promotion.  This would test 
predictions 4 and 5; that incentives are sharpest when p is closest to 1/2 (since we know when 
majority of people become eligible for promotion, we know what p is likely to be over time) and that 
teachers that are repeatedly passed over for promotions have lower incentives.  We expect that 
during the key promotion period, effort will be higher, and that it will drop the more time teachers 
spend in a rank, so coefficients on the dummies will become negative and progressively lower. 
                                                          
9
 We also estimate a version with ability variables included, and the results were the same so are not reported. 
10
 This specification assumes that the teacher fixed effect is correlated with the included regressors, but gets 
swept away.  It also assumes that the dummies are exogenous; we will return to this later. 
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 We then look at other implications of the model, by successively adding measures of 
'competition' as well as proxies for ability.   
 The specification with all of the relevant variables is:  
                                      (8) 
where Cit-1 is one or a set of competition variables at time t - 1, and Ait is the set of measures 
proxying for ability, or is an ability index, relative to other teachers in that rank at time t - 1.   
 The following measures of competition are used: 
1. Dummies for whether teacher i received an 'excellent' or a 'good' evaluation score on the 
previous year's evaluation.  This should indicate how teachers behave based on their past 
performance, and on the information that they receive about it.  Do teachers that have been 
doing well in previous years slack off?  A negative coefficient on the dummy for an excellent 
evaluation would demonstrate this effect.  (Prediction 7) 
2. The average score of the evaluations of all other teachers in the same rank and same school 
in the year before.  This is meant to capture the way in which a teacher responds to other 
teachers' performance, or measures of peers effort/ability.  (Prediction 7) 
3. The proportion of teachers in the same rank in the same school in the year before.  This will 
provide insight as to how effort changes with the number of competitors (n).  Note that this 
is identified by variation over time for the same individual.  Here we expect a positive 
coefficient for promotions where the probability of promotions is between 1/3 and 2/3, i.e. 
in the key promotion period of Primary 2 to Primary 1, Primary 1 to Primary high, and 
Middle 2 to Middle 1. (Prediction 8) 
 Proxies for ability/skill are also included in some specifications.  Before teachers apply for a 
posting, they must take three tests: an education test, a psychology test, and a language test.  Scores 
on these tests are included by first standardizing the scores by the year in which they were taken, 
and then for each year of the data (2003-2006) the following measure is calculated: [S - 
ave(S)]/ave(S) where S is the standardized score on the tests for a teacher, and ave(S) is the average 
of the scores of the teachers in the same rank in the same school in the year before11.  Thus, these 
measures compare how the teacher scored relative to others in his/her rank and school in the 
previous year, which is the relevant group that he/she is competing against for promotions.  Another 
measure of ability is the level of education the teacher had when he/she began teaching.  Education 
                                                          
11
 If in one of these years the teacher was in a lower rank, those are not used (only the current rank is 
relevant). 
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is defined in years of education and is relative to other teachers in the same rank and school in the 
year before (as with the tests above).  Finally, we attempted to create an 'ability' index using the 
three test scores and the number of years of education using Principal Components Analysis (PCA)12.  
The ability index is included by first splitting the index into quintiles and then by including dummies 
for all but the middle (third) quintile.  These dummies are identified off teachers changing from one 
quintile to another, and they capture a change in the quality of the competition (as this is relative to 
other teachers).  In regressions that include the ability proxies or the index quintile dummies, 
another variable is also included that controls for the year in which these tests were taken relative to 
other teachers in the same rank in the same school in the year before.  This will account for the fact 
that the tests would have been different if taken many years ago.  The ability measures are meant to 
capture the effect of beliefs about a teacher's ability relative to those he/she is competing against 
(prediction 7) and to control for relative ability.13  Negative coefficients on the ability variables, 
similar to finding negative coefficients on the evaluation scores of peers, would mean that teachers 
revise downwards their beliefs on their ability relative to others, and as a result, put in less effort.   
 There are some potential problems with our estimation strategy.  First, we do not include 
many teachers' personal characteristics.  Those that are time-invariant are swept away by the 
teacher fixed effect.  However, if there are time-varying unobservables that are correlated with 
variables that are included in the model, then coefficient estimates would be biased.  For example, if 
it were the case that teachers that become wealthier tend to get promoted faster, then coefficient 
estimates would be biased upwards.  However, we do not expect teachers' personal characteristics 
to vary systematically, and thus their omission should not present a problem.  Second, including past 
evaluations in the regression could cause serial correlation.  This is the reason for using the average 
score of all other teachers as an alternative way to test prediction 7.   
 Third, there is a selection problem, in that since we are looking at the number of years after 
a promotion but we only have data for 2003-2006, this means that we have information on people in 
the sample for different periods of time after promotion.  For some we observe the first few years 
after promotion, for some we observe the next few years, and for some we only observe from 
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 Another index was also constructed that standardized each of the variables and then summed them.  This 
did not affect the results. 
13
 Other measures of competition were also attempted, including a variable measuring a teacher's rank in the 
evaluation compared with teachers in the same rank in the same school in the previous year (defined in the 
same way as the test scores).  This measure was also split into dummies for the teacher with the highest 
ranking and the teacher with the lowest ranking in that rank and school in the year before.  A number of 
interaction effects were also attempted including interacting the proportion of teachers in a rank with the 
dummies, and interacting the 'peers' variable with the dummies.  The proportion of teachers variable was also 
split into quartiles.  The results were robust to these variations and thus they are not reported here. 
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fifteen to nineteen years after promotion.  The reasons we observe teachers for a specific time 
frame is not random; those teachers that have been in a rank for longer than others are certainly 
different from those that got promoted earlier.  However, because we have the teacher fixed effect 
which captures the level effects, selection would only be a problem if the change in effort varies for 
teachers at different times in ways that are correlated with things that we have not been able to 
control for. 
 Finally, measurement error could be another potential source of bias.  Here, we would be 
most concerned with measurement error in the evaluation scores, or with systematic bias in the 
evaluation scores.  The systematic bias could arise if, for example, principals tend to inflate teachers' 
performance on their evaluations (perhaps as a source of encouragement).  For these regressions, 
measurement error in the evaluation scores would only be a problem if it were systematic 
(correlated with the regressors).  This would be the case if, for example, principals tended to over-
evaluate teachers' performance if the teacher had more experience or had been in a rank for longer.  
However, we do not find evidence for such effects in the data.   
 The final set of regressions examine the determinants of promotion, primarily to see 
whether evaluations are important for promotions, and if not, what does matter for promotion.  
Two sets of regressions are run for each of the five possible promotions (Primary 2 to Primary 1, 
Primary 1 to Primary high, Middle 3 to Middle 2, Middle 2 to Middle 1 and Middle 1 to Middle high); 
one is a set of Probit regressions, and the other is conditional fixed effects Logit.  In both cases, the 
outcome is whether or not the teacher was promoted in that year (again we use the years 2003-
2006) and the variable of interest is the evaluations.  We include dummies for education level in that 
year, and then we progressively add: the proportion of teachers in the school at that rank, the 
average scores of all other teachers in the same rank, the dummy variables for years into a rank, the 
evaluation scores interacted with a dummy for the period before the key period of promotions and  
a dummy for the period following the key promotion period at that level (the key promotion period 
dummy being the omitted category), and the ability measures both separately and in the form of the 
index (we also include the timing of the tests variable in these latter regressions).  In the Probit 
regressions we also include the teacher's age and a dummy for whether or not the teacher is female.  
Evaluations are included in two ways, the first is the evaluation score for that year14, and the second 
is a dummy for whether the evaluation score was 'excellent', and a dummy for whether the 
evaluation was 'good' (the omitted category is 'pass/fail').  Positive coefficients on the evaluation 
regressor or the dummies for excellent and good evaluations would indicate that evaluations do 
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 The evaluations are conducted in June of each school year, and promotions occur over the summer. 
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matter for promotion.  We expect that they will.  The time after promotion dummies would serve to 
confirm the survival functions in terms of the timing of promotions.      
  Measurement error could be an issue with these regressions as well, as the evaluation 
scores are one of the regressors.  Measurement error here could result in attenuation bias.  
Evaluations are likely an imperfect measure of teacher effort, but they do incorporate several 
dimensions of teacher effort, as they are based on student test scores, teacher attitude, attendance, 
and preparation.   
6.  Results 
 
 This section will present the results of the econometric analysis.  We will begin with whether 
or not promotions are used as an incentive for effort in this context.  Table 3 reports the results from 
estimating equation (6) for primary and middle school with the rank 'intern' or 'middle 3', and with 
the education level of primary school as the omitted categories.   
 We see that wages increase (relative to an intern or Middle 3 salary) by rank level for both 
primary and middle school; the coefficients on all rank dummies are positive and significant.  Wages 
also decrease with experience (there is a correlation between experience and rank), non-linearly, 
and somewhat with education (only for those that have a four year degree or higher in primary 
school).  The evaluation score is not important, indicating that what matters here is promotion to a 
higher rank.  Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the rank levels are greater than 
those on the education dummies.  At the Primary high level, the increase in salary is more than 100% 
relative to an intern's salary.  So, promotions are being used as incentives.   
 Furthermore, the salary differentials are highest where the promotion rates are closer to 
zero or one.  The promotions with the promotion rates closest to one are Primary 2 to Primary 1 and 
Middle 3 to Middle 2.  The promotion with the promotion rate closest to zero is Middle 1 to Middle 
high (although the promotion rate overall is just below 25% so it is not that low).  Table 4 reports the 
average monthly salary (and its standard deviation) for teachers at each rank level.  As expected, 
salaries increase with rank.  The biggest jumps are from Primary 2 to Primary 1, followed by Middle 3 
to Middle 2, and then Middle 1 to Middle high.  As Table 3 shows, the salary increases are 32.4%, 
25.1%, and 21.5% respectively.     
 This confirms prediction 9: that salary differentials will be highest for promotion rates closer 
to zero or one.  Models of promotion tournaments predict that salary increases are highest at the 
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top level (CEO pay), and empirical studies do find evidence of this.  This does not seem to be the case 
here.  Although the salary at Middle high level is quite high, the difference between Middle high and 
other teachers is nowhere near that of a CEO compared to other employees in a firm.  This is likely 
to do with the fact that this is a public sector context and teachers cannot be paid such high salaries. 
 Next, we look at effort incentives, specifically, over time and in response to competition.  
The regressions estimate equation (8), which is reproduced here for convenience: 
                                      (8) 
 
We begin with the basic specification with only the time after promotion dummies included but no 
competition or ability variables.  Figure 2 plots the coefficients on the years after promotion 
dummies for each of the six regressions (one for each rank level).  These are the coefficients from 
Table 515, which reports the results from the basic specification in which no competition or ability 
variables are included. 
 As the dummy for one year after promotion is the omitted category for each rank, the 
dummy coefficients for further years after promotion show effects relative to the first year after 
promotion.  Figure 2 shows the trend in 'teacher effort' relative to that first year.  We see that 
predictions 4 and 5 can be affirmed.  For Primary 2, promotion to Primary 1 generally occurs after 4-
5 years.  Effort is high during this time but for those that are still at Primary 2 rank after that, effort is 
steadily decreasing.  For Primary 1, promotion to Primary high is generally not until 10-15 years after 
promotion so effort is quite steady relative to the first year, even several years into the rank, and 
does show a bit of a drop afterwards.  However, the coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero for Primary 2 or Primary 1.  Primary high is the highest level for primary school and thus we 
naturally expect to see a drop off in effort, and quite a steady one is present here (this is prediction 
10, there are no more promotions).  Furthermore, the coefficients are highly significant, and the 
magnitude of the effect increases over time, with people that have been in the rank for 12 or more 
years receiving an evaluation score more than one point lower (from good to pass, for example).  At 
the middle school 3 level, we see a steady decline in effort.  This is likely due to the fact that most 
teachers are automatically promoted to Middle level 2 after 3-4 years.  In this case, p is close to one, 
and as the model predicts, there is very little incentive for effort (prediction 4).  In Middle level 2 the 
average promotion time to Middle 2 is between 4 and 10 years (sometimes more) so this would 
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 There were too few observations at Middle high level, and with most of the variables dropping, results are 
not reported. 
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explain the steady trend in effort that we see, after which there is a decline.  Not many people are 
promoted from Middle level 1 to Middle high level (less than 25%), and thus, the trend of the 
dummies here is a bit more erratic, we would expect more variation in teachers' responses here.  
Thus, in terms of when one becomes eligible for the next rank promotion, we do see effort behaving 
in the way that is expected: it declines for those passed over for promotion (particularly if passed 
over several times), it is very low for promotion probability close to one and for the highest rank, 
and tends to be steady if a promotion is in sight.  Promotions do induce effort.  However, the 
dummy coefficients in this specification are not often significant.  When we control for competition 
and ability, the results are stronger. 
 When we begin to add the competition and ability variables, stronger patterns emerge.  
Figures 3 - 8 plot the dummy coefficients from Table 6, which reports the results from estimation of 
equation (8), our preferred specification with all the ability and competition variables included (the 
final column from each of Tables A2 - A7).16 The blue line plots the dummy coefficients for time after 
promotion from the basic specification discussed above, and the red line plots the dummy 
coefficients from the specification with the ability index quintile dummies and 'peers' variables 
included.  From figures 3 - 8, we see that adding these competition and ability measures changes the 
slope of the dummy trends, and from the appendix tables we see that ability appears to make more 
of a difference than the competition measures.  In Primary 2 the sharp decline in effort becomes less 
pronounced once we control for competition or ability or both.  In Primary 1, we see more effort 
around the main time of promotions, and then a sharper decline.  Furthermore, the coefficients on 
the dummies between 8 and 13 years after promotion are now significant and of much greater 
magnitude indicating that there is actually an increase in effort relative to the first year after 
promotion.  In Primary high, we see effort decline still, but less sharply.  
 In Middle 3 there is not much difference, except that the decrease in effort becomes more 
steady.  In Middle 2 and Middle 1 there appears to be more effort once competition or ability (or 
both) are controlled for.  At the Middle 2 level, the dummy coefficients once again become 
significant with the inclusion of the competition and ability variables, and the magnitudes greater.  
So for primary 2 and primary high, the decline in effort is less with the inclusion of the competition 
and/or ability measures.  For the remainder of the rank levels, the increase in effort is accentuated.  
When we see that inclusion of these variables changes the magnitude and significance of the 
dummies, this could be because of a correlation between ability and time to promotion.  The longer 
a teacher has been in a rank, the more likely it is that a teacher will be promoted.  Furthermore, as 
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 Tables A2 - A7 in the appendix report results from all of the regressions for equation (8), with each column 
including a new competition or ability variable separately.   
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time goes by, lower ability people tend to remain in the rank (or people that tend not to apply for 
promotion), so there is a negative correlation between number of years into a rank and ability (the 
selection problem mentioned earlier).  This would explain why leaving ability out of the model would 
attenuate or accentuate the coefficients on the dummies, and this would be a mis-specification.  
Furthermore, at the Primary level, the dummy for the fourth quintile of the ability index is positive 
and significant, indicating that those with higher ability receive higher evaluation scores.  At the 
Middle school level, the dummies for the fourth quintile are positive but insignificant.  The dummies 
for the first and second quintiles are generally negative, and those for the fifth quintile are either 
negative or almost zero and insignificant.  Thus, where one falls in the ability distribution is 
important, and it is those that are closer to the margin who have more incentive for effort, and for 
those either below or far above the margin, incentives are much lower.  Inclusion of the proportion 
of teachers in the same rank and school variable does not add any information, the coefficients are 
never significantly different from zero.  We will return to this later.   
  In terms of the competition variables, the effect that appears to stand out most is that of the 
teachers' previous evaluations (see column 2 of appendix  tables A2-A7).  At all rank levels except 
Middle 1, if a teacher received an 'excellent' evaluation score in the previous year, he/she receives a 
lower evaluation score in the current year.  At the Primary 2 level, this effect is large, reducing the 
current year's evaluation score by half a point on average.  At the Primary 1 and Middle 2 levels, the 
effect is also significant and reduces the current year's evaluation score by approximately 0.3.  This 
would suggest that prediction 7 holds; a teacher that has been doing well in the past may update 
his/her information and subsequently slack off.  It could also be evidence of principals skewing 
evaluation scores to motivate teachers.  Alternatively, this could indicate mean reversion.  After all, 
excellent evaluations are not easy to achieve and one cannot receive them all the time.  However, as 
discussed previously, including lagged evaluation scores may induce bias.  This effect disappears 
when we include the average score of all other teachers in the same school and rank in the previous 
year.  The coefficient on this variable is very low and is insignificant for all rank levels except for 
Middle level one, where it is marginally significant (but positive).  This may indicate either that 
teachers' effort does not respond to where they believe they fall in the skill distribution, or it could 
mean that teachers do not have information on other teachers' scores and thus are not able to 
update their beliefs.  The teachers would have information on their history of evaluations, but not 
necessarily on other teachers' evaluations and probably not on the distribution of evaluation scores 
by rank, which is the relevant group they are competing against.  This suggests that teachers likely 
do not have information on other teachers' ability rankings (it is very unlikely that a teacher would 
know the test scores of other teachers from their teacher tests). 
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 The finding that the number of competitors does not matter is surprising.  To investigate 
prediction 8 further (the effect of the size of the pool of competitors), a regression was also run with 
the evaluation scores as the outcome again, but with all the observations pooled across ranks, and 
the number of teachers in the same rank in the same school interacted with the years after 
promotion dummies for all the rank levels.  The regression is carried out with school-year fixed 
effects (which controls for the overall size of the school).  Figure 9 (and Table A8) reports these 
results, with each point being the coefficient on the dummy for number of years after promotion 
interacted with the number of teachers in the same rank in the same school.   
 Prediction 8 states that for values of p between 1/3 and 2/3, adding more contestants (n) 
while keeping the ratio k/n fixed17 will increase the MPE and thus incentives for effort are higher.  
The opposite is true for values outside this interval.  Figure 9 supports prediction 8.  In Primary 2 
almost everyone is promoted to Primary 1, and this is generally within 4-10 years (p is high, likely 
higher than 2/3).  None of the coefficients are significant here.  In Primary 1, it is unlikely that one 
will get a promotion before 5 or 6 years (p is low) as that is the minimum amount of time that one 
must wait to apply for promotion to Primary high.  Before 5 years the coefficients are negative and 
significant and after 5 years there are positive coefficients.  In fact, for 3 and 4 years after 
promotion, an increase in the number of competitors decreases the evaluation score by 
approximately half a point.  Most promotions from Primary 1 to Primary high occur between 8 and 
15 years after having been in Primary 1 rank, and we see positive coefficients in this range.  After 
that, if a teacher is still in Primary 1 it may be unlikely that they will be promoted to Primary high 
and so p (and effort incentives therefore) is low.  For teachers in Middle 3 rank, the probability of 
promotion is quite high (everyone is promoted to Middle 2 at some point) but is highest between 2 
and 4 years.  Here again we see incentives increase.  For Middle 2 level teachers the probability of 
promotion is again highest and is likely in the middle ranges between 5 and 10 years.  We see weak 
evidence of incentives increasing here as well, with incentives dropping sharply if the competition 
increases for those still at Middle level 2 for more than 15 years, when p is quite low.  For Middle 1 
to Middle high, not very many people get promoted at all (less than a quarter).  However, for those 
that do get promoted it is usually between 8 and 15 years and once again we see incentives increase 
with the number of teachers.  The magnitude for 9 and 10 years after promotion is quite high, with 
an increase in the number of teachers increasing the evaluation score by 1.74.  In this case it seems 
that competition really matters.  It appears that prediction 8 fits this data well.   
                                                          
17
 k/n is fixed here because it is determined by the district through quotas for ranks in each school. 
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 In terms of competition then, what seems to be occurring is that the number of competitors 
affects one's effort incentives (depending on the timing, which is what determines one's probability 
of promotion), but teachers are not able to adequately update their beliefs regarding where they fall 
in the ability distribution relative to others.  As discussed in section III, when teachers have less 
information about their ability, this can increase incentives, and so promotions here may serve as an 
even more effective sorting and incentive mechanism.   
 In terms of effort and wages, the model predicts that effort will be highest where the wage 
jump is largest.  We do see effort increasing up to the time of the most promotions for Primary 2 to 
Primary 1, but we see a decline in effort for Middle 3 to Middle 2.  This may be because the 
promotion rate is too close to one.  The large increase in salary from Middle 1 to Middle high may 
also help explain why we do see effort at this rank level even though the promotion rate is low. 
 The final set of regressions looks at the determinants of promotion to see whether 
evaluations matter for promotion.  If they do, then promotions provide effective incentives for 
effort.  A binary outcome is used (promoted or not promoted) for the years 2003-2006.  Tables A9 - 
A18 report the results.  Tables A9 - A13 report Probit specifications for each promotion (Primary 2 to 
Primary 1, Primary 1 to Primary high, Middle 3 to Middle 2, Middle 2 to Middle 1, and Middle 1 to 
Middle high), and tables A14 - A18 report conditional fixed effects Logit results18.  In the Probit 
regressions, for Primary 1, Middle 3 and Middle 2, we see that there is a positive and significant 
(albeit marginally significant) effect of evaluation scores on probability of promotion.  For Primary 1 
and Middle 3, it matters even more if you received an excellent evaluation score.  In the conditional 
fixed effects Logit regressions, this effect disappears.  However, the conditional fixed effects Logit 
regression omits those observations for whom there was no promotion between 2003 and 2006 and 
thus standard errors are larger.  It also uses only within-person variation.  To further disentangle the 
effects of evaluations, each rank was split into three periods: the pre-promotion period, the key 
promotion period, and the post-promotion period, and a dummy was created for each one.  The key 
promotion period was determined as the years for which majority of promotions occur at that rank.  
For Primary high and Middle high, the dummies were simply split into three equal sized groups since 
there are no more promotions at those levels.  In column 7 of each of tables A9 - A18, results are 
reported for the specification with evaluation scores interacted with the dummy for the pre-
promotion period and that of the post-promotion period (leaving the key promotion period as the 
omitted category). In both the Probit and the Logit regressions, positive evaluations before the 
                                                          
18
 Marginal effects are not reported for conditional Logit, the presence of the fixed effect makes these difficult 
to interpret (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  Instead, coefficients are reported so we cannot comment on the 
size of the effects, only the direction and level of significance.   
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critical period affect the probability of promotion less than evaluations during the critical promotion 
period at each level.  In the Logit regressions, the evaluations after the critical period have a positive 
and significant effect.  In the Probit regressions, this remains the case, except in Primary 2 and 
Middle 3 where a higher evaluation has a lower impact on your probability of promotion in the 
period after the critical period of promotions than during the critical period.  For Primary 1, Middle 
2, and Middle 1 you can still get promoted after a few years.  For Primary 2 and Middle 3 if you miss 
the key promotion period you may not get promoted.  The magnitude of the coefficients is small, the 
largest being a decrease of 7% in the pre-promotion period for Middle 3.  So, evaluations do matter, 
and they matter most around the key promotion times.  This is evidence that promotions provide 
effort incentives.   
 These regressions also confirm that the timing of promotions for each rank is in accordance 
with the Kaplan-Meier survival functions and Table A1 as evidenced by the dummy coefficients in 
column 6 of each table.  Furthermore, the number of teachers in one's rank appears to matter in 
some cases.  In Primary 2 and Middle 3, the more teachers one is competing against, the lower the 
probability of promotion. This is interesting because these are the levels with the highest probability 
of promotion overall; most teachers do get promoted.  For Middle 2 to Middle 1, the teachers 
variable is positive in the Logit regressions, so the more teachers, the higher the probability of 
promotion.  This could be an effort effect; perhaps in Primary 2 and Middle 3, teachers know that 
they will most likely get promoted and slack off, even if there are a lot of teachers they are 
competing against.  For Middle 2 to Middle 1, not everyone is promoted and thus teachers must put 
in effort to be promoted and if there are more teachers, they must work even harder.  We did see 
that effort in Primary 2 and Middle 3 drops off but that it remains high and steady for Middle 2.   
7.  Conclusions 
 
 This paper has attempted to gain insight into the way in which the system of promotions and 
annual evaluations in China affects teachers' effort incentives.  A model of promotions as a sorting 
and as an incentive mechanism was developed, that modelled teachers as having a particular skill 
level, as well as discussed beliefs over one's skill level relative to others in their cohort.  The model 
included a performance measure measured with error.  The teacher's first order condition was 
derived and simplified in order to study how the marginal probability of effort changed with respect 
to the number of teachers, the probability of promotion, and beliefs about skill.  A number of 
predictions were established, and data from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) was 
used to test the predictions of the model.  
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 In summary, many of the predictions of the model are evident in the data.  First, promotions 
are used for incentives amongst teachers in China.  Rank levels are the strongest predictors of 
variation in monthly wage.  Furthermore, predictions 1 and 9 are also apparent here.  The larger the 
salary differential (combined with the probability of promotion being closer to 1/2), the higher the 
effort (Primary 1 to Primary high and Middle 2 to Middle 1), and for promotion rates closer to zero 
or one, the salary differentials are greatest (Primary 2 to Primary 1 and Middle 3 to Middle 2).  
 In addition, promotions do elicit effort.  When a teacher becomes eligible for promotion, 
he/she exhibits higher effort in the form of higher evaluation scores.  When promotion is not likely 
either because it is too soon after the most recent promotion, or the teacher has been in the rank 
for far too long, or because there are no more promotions, effort drops significantly (predictions 4, 5 
and 10).  The number of teachers that one is competing with matters.  If the probability of 
promotion is very low or very high, then more competition implies lower effort, and if the 
probability of promotion is between 1/3 and 2/3, effort is higher (prediction 8).  The harder it is to 
obtain the promotion and the more competitors, the harder one works for promotion.  Teachers 
that have been doing well in the past tend to slack off.  However, they are not able to update their 
beliefs on their relative position in the ability distribution, likely because other teachers' evaluation 
scores (or other ability variables) by rank are not made public.  If a teacher receives an excellent 
evaluation in the previous year, he/she will believe that their ability is likely above the 1 - pth 
percentile and will have lower incentives (predictions 4 and 7). The fact that there is less information 
available to them (not reporting everyone's scores) means that it is possible that both those farther 
ahead and farther behind do not know exactly where they stand relative to others and this would 
mean that they believe they are closer to the margin than they would if all scores were revealed.  
Perhaps this is the reason (combined with the relatively high salary increase) that we see effort in 
Middle 1 even though only a few are promoted to Middle high level.  Evaluations seem to matter for 
promotion, and particularly during the critical time for promotions.  Thus, the promotions do serve 
as effective incentives for effort.   
 These findings suggest several policy implications.  The most important is that incentivizing 
teachers based on performance pay may not be necessary.  The use of bonuses amongst this sample 
of teachers is very low, however, the system of promotions seems to be incentive enough for effort 
in many cases.  The fact that effort drops steadily in the highest ranks may make a case for using 
performance pay at these levels to keep motivation high, but at lower levels it may not be necessary.  
However, this system is quite complex and may be difficult to implement in some places.  The 
culture and traditions surrounding hiring and promotion of teachers may not be conducive to such a 
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system; in places in which meritocracy is appreciated, such a system may fare better.  The findings 
on salary levels and on the number of teachers in a contest would also provide policy makers with an 
idea as to how to mould the salary structure to optimally motivate effort, and would provide some 
insight into optimal school size and how to split teachers into contests.  Finally, these results also 
help explain the success of the Chinese economic reforms in general.  The reforms in the 
government in particular were very much tied to bureaucratic performance and merit-based 
promotions.  The system is quite sophisticated and understudied, but can provide examples of good 
practice for other contexts. 
 There are many extensions to this work that one can envisage.  First, data on evaluation 
scores of teachers in subsequent rounds of the survey would enrich the analysis by ameliorating the 
selection problem that was noted.  Furthermore, better data on teachers' ability would provide 
better proxies.  Second, the fact that the evaluations can be based on different aspects of teaching 
merits further study, which is outside of the scope of this paper.  It may be the case that different 
types of evaluations elicit different types of effort among teachers.  Such a study would need to 
adequately control for how the choice of evaluation system is determined.  Finally, in order to make 
more specific recommendations, such studies should be carried out in other contexts and/or 
countries so that external validity can be discussed, and policy implications made clearer.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Kaplan-Meier survival functions for number of years until promotion 
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Figure 2.  Dummy coefficients, Primary 1 - Middle 1 
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Figure 3.  Primary 2       Figure 4. Primary 1 
 
Figure 5. Primary high        Figure 6.  Middle 3 
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Figure 7. Middle 2       Figure 8.  Middle 1 
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Figure 9.  Proportion of teachers in the same rank 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Teachers in the sample, Round 3 (2007) 
  
No 
title/Intern 
Primary 
2 
Primary 
1 
Primary 
high 
Middle 
3 
Middle 
2 
Middle 
1 
Middle 
high 
Number of teachers 
        Total 331 163 553 354 133 525 281 13 
Male 43% 42% 55% 75% 51% 63% 83% 85% 
Female 57% 58% 45% 25% 49% 37% 17% 15% 
Basic characteristics 
        Average Age 29.09 28.3 36.7 48 26.8 32.3 40.6 47.2 
Average Years teaching 7 7 16.3 27.6 4 10.1 19.7 27.6 
Education - primary 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Education - middle school 5% 2% 3% 3% 1% 2% 1% 0% 
Education - high school 23% 7% 22% 48% 2% 2% 10% 0% 
Education - vocational 
middle 20% 55% 63% 45% 13% 32% 47% 54% 
Education - vocational tech 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Education - vocational 
college 45% 34% 12% 4% 83% 57% 38% 46% 
Education - four year degree 6% 1% 0% 0% 2% 7% 3% 0% 
Ability measures 
        Education test score  (90-99) 12.1% 11.8% 18.2% 17.0% 10.8% 17.8% 15.1% 40% 
Education test score (80-89) 60.1% 59.7% 59.5% 59.2% 59.2% 60.8% 65.5% 60% 
Education test score (70-79) 21.4% 18.8% 19.8% 20.3% 26.9% 17.6% 15.9% - 
Education test score (60-69) 5.7% 8.3% 2.5% 3.2% 2.3% 3.9% 2.8% - 
Education test score (below 
60) 0.7% 1.4% - 0.3% 0.8% - 0.8% - 
Psychology test score (90-99) 11.9% 19.3% 15.8% 15.0% 11.7% 17.3% 13.9% 30% 
Psychology test score (80-89) 53.2% 47.6% 57.6% 54.6% 50.0% 55.8% 55.6% 70% 
Psychology test score (70-79) 23.7% 22.1% 21.8% 25.2% 28.9% 19.6% 25.8% - 
Psychology test score (60-69) 10.1% 9.7% 4.8% 4.9% 9.4% 7.3% 4.0% - 
Psychology test score (below 
60) 1.1% 1.4% - 0.3% - - 0.8% - 
Language test score (90-99) 2.9% 0.7% 1.2% 4.8% 3.8% 2.0% 3.0% 20% 
Language test score (80-89) 38.5% 45.8% 36.8% 31.8% 42.4% 38.9% 31.6% 40% 
Language test score (70-79) 11.2% 8.5% 15.0% 21.8% 10.6% 10.3% 16.2% 20% 
Language test score (60-69) 47.1% 44.4% 41.8% 33.3% 40.9% 46.2% 37.2% 20% 
Language test score (below 
60) 0.4% 0.7% 5.1% 8.3% 2.3% 2.6% 12.0% - 
Number of awards received 
(avg) 2.3 2.85 5.16 6.15 1.47 3.65 6.52 10.08 
Time use 
        Hours per week spent 
grading (avg) 10.4 11.62 9.62 9.24 9.92 9.13 9.16 7.38 
Hours per week on lesson 
plans (avg) 9.98 9.66 9.18 9.11 9.61 9.23 9.7 7.92 
Published a paper 12.1% 25.2% 46.5% 35.9% 17.3% 45.9% 57.3% 100.0% 
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(proportion) 
Number of classes taught 
(avg) 17.57 19.34 18.05 17.79 14.34 13.7 13.13 9.84 
Hours per week spent with 
students (avg) 14.18 13.67 12.09 11.24 14.58 12.82 12.44 7.03 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Evaluation scores of teachers by rank (2003-2006)19 
  Primary 2 Primary 1 Primary high 
    Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
  Fail 3 0.4% 4 0.2% 1 0.1% 
  Pass  396 48.4% 973 49.9% 526 50.7% 
  Good  291 35.5% 675 34.6% 378 36.5% 
  Excellent 129 15.8% 297 15.2% 132 12.7% 
  Total 819 100.0% 1,949 100.0% 1,037 100.0% 
  
           Middle 3 Middle 2 Middle 1 Middle high 
  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Fail - - 5 0.3% 1 0.1% - - 
Pass  473 56.1% 906 54.9% 802 51.1% 16 55.2% 
Good  253 30.0% 487 29.5% 502 32.0% 10 34.5% 
Excellent 117 13.9% 251 15.2% 263 16.8% 3 10.3% 
Total 843 100.0% 1,649 100.0% 1,568 100.0% 29 100.0% 
 
 
  
                                                          
19
 Primary school interns do not have annual evaluations. 
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Table 3.  Wage regression (log of wage, CNY/month) 
  Primary School Middle School 
  coef se coef se 
Primary 2 0.690*** 0.050 
  
Primary 1 1.043*** 0.059 
  
Primary high 1.155*** 0.072 
  
Middle 2 
  
0.084*** 0.026 
Middle 1 
  
0.149*** 0.031 
Middle high 
  
0.281*** 0.049 
Experience -0.018*** 0.007 0.033*** 0.004 
Experience squared 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Evaluation score 2006 -0.013 0.015 -0.009 0.008 
Education - middle school -0.061 0.140 (dropped) 
 
Education - high school -0.088 0.114 -0.130* 0.069 
Education - vocational middle school 0.135 0.116 -0.055* 0.029 
Education - vocational college -0.021 0.158 0.010 0.170 
Education - four year degree 0.335*** 0.120 -0.035 0.029 
Education - graduate school 0.705*** 0.156 0.002 0.037 
Constant 6.071*** 0.138 6.851*** 0.043 
Number of observations 1,330 943 
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.432 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
Table 4.  Salaries across ranks (CNY / month) 
  Average salary Standard deviation Increase 
Primary 2 974.15 261.23 - 
Primary 1 1289.63 230.19 32.4% 
Primary high 1511.27 271.48 17.2% 
Middle 3 1015.87 235.4 - 
Middle 2 1270.69 229.79 25.1% 
Middle 1 1534.88 233.46 20.8% 
Middle high 1865.62 263.54 21.5% 
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Table 5.  No competition or ability variables, Primary 2 - Middle 1 
  Primary 2 Primary 1 Primary high Middle 3 Middle 2 Middle 1 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after 0.068 0.086 -0.072 0.074 -0.043 0.085 0.161 0.108 0.056 0.064 -0.068 0.083 
3 years after 0.055 0.101 -0.030 0.085 -0.112 0.094 -0.131 0.140 0.117 0.074 -0.100 0.093 
4 years after -0.116 0.139 -0.084 0.094 -0.198* 0.103 -0.222 0.221 0.125 0.087 -0.019 0.106 
5 years after 0.232 0.235 0.124 0.102 -0.300*** 0.112 -0.675** 0.316 0.219** 0.108 -0.227* 0.122 
6 years after -0.219 0.373 -0.053 0.113 -0.285** 0.123 -0.453 0.440 0.307** 0.121 -0.414*** 0.140 
7 years after -0.543 0.462 -0.047 0.121 -0.428*** 0.146 
  
0.329** 0.134 -0.244 0.164 
8 years after (for 
Primary 2, 8 to 13 
yrs) 
-0.439 0.486 -0.005 0.128 -0.569*** 0.156 
  
0.268* 0.154 -0.373** 0.179 
9 years after (for 
Primary 2, 14 yrs) 
(dropped) 
 
-0.010 0.135 -0.722*** 0.168 
  
0.193 0.164 -0.300 0.202 
10 years after 
  
-0.006 0.147 -0.696*** 0.176 
  
0.241 0.177 -0.230 0.223 
11 years after 
  
0.040 0.163 -0.887*** 0.184 
  
0.297 0.196 -0.164 0.261 
12 years after 
  
-0.094 0.193 -0.959*** 0.199 
  
0.204 0.215 -0.190 0.280 
13 years after 
  
0.054 0.210 -1.002*** 0.212 
  
0.191 0.244 -0.346 0.302 
14 years after 
  
0.008 0.266 -1.353*** 0.337 
  
0.281 0.277 -0.132 0.367 
15 years after 
  
0.172 0.304 -1.308*** 0.421 
  
0.292 0.368 
  16 years after 
  
-0.037 0.312 
        17 years after 
  
-0.199 0.319 
        18 years after 
  
-0.235 0.343 
        19 years after 
  
-0.142 0.416 
        Constant 2.728*** 0.072 2.646*** 0.092 3.011*** 0.100 2.646*** 0.081 2.404*** 0.077 2.706*** 0.092 
Number of 
observations 
472 1,691 1,006 257 1,259 687 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.017 0.047 0.081 0.012 0.033 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.  Ability variables included, Primary 2 - Middle 1 
 
  Primary 2 Primary 1 Primary high Middle 3 Middle 2 Middle 1 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after 0.330 0.247 0.036 0.131 -0.091 0.166 0.135 0.391 0.109 0.103 0.023 0.105 
3 years after 0.265 0.254 -0.013 0.141 -0.104 0.176 -0.276 0.388 0.236** 0.113 -0.077 0.125 
4 years after 0.017 0.288 0.012 0.154 -0.199 0.196 -0.666 0.483 0.325** 0.126 0.085 0.146 
5 years after 0.410 0.375 0.204 0.160 -0.191 0.204 -0.911 0.586 0.431*** 0.155 -0.157 0.170 
6 years after 0.364 0.635 0.163 0.175 -0.183 0.218 -0.940 1.047 0.464*** 0.176 -0.292 0.195 
7 years after 0.234 0.846 0.215 0.186 -0.256 0.252 
  
0.447** 0.196 0.076 0.231 
8 years after (for 
Primary 2, 8 to 13 yrs) 
0.260 0.894 0.335* 0.195 -0.272 0.276 
  
0.498** 0.232 -0.173 0.256 
9 years after (for 
Primary 2, 14 yrs) 
(dropped) 
 
0.344* 0.205 -0.235 0.304 
  
0.478* 0.252 0.064 0.292 
10 years after 
  
0.445** 0.219 -0.292 0.315 
  
0.583** 0.269 -0.100 0.322 
11 years after 
  
0.569** 0.239 -0.325 0.328 
  
0.474 0.302 -0.065 0.387 
12 years after 
  
0.431 0.276 -0.365 0.346 
  
0.404 0.334 -0.115 0.420 
13 years after 
  
0.515* 0.294 -0.371 0.356 
  
0.266 0.368 -0.229 0.445 
14 years after 
  
0.240 0.369 -0.544 0.502 
  
0.264 0.412 0.044 0.525 
15 years after 
  
0.369 0.510 -0.460 0.613 
  
0.118 0.540 
  16 years after 
  
0.305 0.540 
        17 years after 
  
0.167 0.547 
        18 years after 
  
0.017 0.569 
        19 years after 
  
-0.146 0.637 
        Score of all teachers 
but you 
-0.017 0.033 -0.022 0.057 -0.036 0.066 0.008 0.044 0.032 0.049 0.197* 0.104 
Timing of tests 
(relative to peers) 
0.039 0.146 0.022 0.184 -0.567 0.422 0.118 0.163 0.187* 0.111 0.023 0.081 
Ability index quintile 1 -0.000 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.009 0.008 
Ability index quintile 2 -0.127 0.240 0.197 0.180 0.280 0.313 -0.041 0.264 0.103 0.181 -0.002 0.286 
Ability index quintile 4 0.573** 0.265 0.454*** 0.137 0.157 0.227 0.448 0.419 0.076 0.111 -0.189 0.153 
Ability index quintile 5 -0.005 0.007 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.002 
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Constant 2.498*** 0.166 2.450*** 0.223 2.906*** 0.289 2.649*** 0.276 2.188*** 0.172 2.078*** 0.335 
Number of 
observations 
312 1,221 658 170 936 525 
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.042 0.020 0.159 0.034 0.089 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Proportion of teachers in the sample promoted after x years 
  
Primary 2 to 
Primary 1 
Primary 1 to 
Primary high 
Middle 3 to 
Middle 2 
Middle 2 to 
Middle 1 
Middle 1 to 
Middle high 
1 year 2.08 - 5.05 1.15 - 
2 years 7.62 3.85 21.3 1.72 11.11 
3 years 15.47 4.33 28.88 4.6 - 
4 years 27.02 4.81 19.13 10.92 - 
5 years 24.71 11.54 14.08 20.69 - 
6 years 5.54 11.54 6.5 10.92 - 
7 years 4.62 9.62 1.81 9.2 - 
8 years 2.31 10.58 1.44 12.07 - 
9 years 3 6.25 1.81 10.34 33.33 
10 years 1.85 10.1 - 6.32 11.11 
11 years 0.92 9.62 - 2.3 11.11 
12 years 1.15 6.25 - 4.02 - 
13 years 1.15 3.37 - 4.02 11.11 
14 years 0.69 1.44 - 1.15 11.11 
15 years 0.69 1.92 - - 11.11 
16 years 0.23 2.88 - - - 
17 years 0.23 1.92 - - - 
18 years 0.23 - - - - 
19 years - - - - - 
20 years - - - - - 
21 years 0.23 - - - - 
22 years - - - - - 
23 years - - - - - 
24 years 0.23 - - - - 
25 years - - - - - 
26 years - - - 0.57 - 
Longest 
without 
promotion 
to next 
level 
20 years 29 years 20 years 
52 years 
(followed by 
20) 
22 years 
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Table A2. School Fixed-Effects regression on evaluation scores, Primary 2 
  
No competition 
variables 
Last year's 
evaluation  
Evaluations of all 
teachers but you 
Ability variables 
All competition and 
ability var's 
Ability index 
quintiles 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after promotion 0.068 0.086 0.189* 0.104 0.253 0.232 0.192 0.161 0.202 0.285 0.330 0.247 
3 years after promotion 0.055 0.101 0.161 0.134 0.192 0.251 0.222 0.180 0.155 0.304 0.265 0.254 
4 years after promotion -0.116 0.139 0.084 0.183 -0.022 0.297 0.055 0.224 -0.059 0.353 0.017 0.288 
5 years after promotion 0.232 0.235 0.346 0.283 0.382 0.372 0.423 0.343 0.370 0.430 0.410 0.375 
6 years after promotion -0.219 0.373 0.271 0.555 0.249 0.628 0.422 0.913 0.325 0.963 0.364 0.635 
7 years after promotion  -0.543 0.462 0.026 0.699 0.187 0.823 0.263 1.075 0.019 1.118 0.234 0.846 
8 to 13 years after 
promotion 
-0.439 0.486 0.092 0.724 0.196 0.870 0.281 1.116 -0.005 1.161 0.260 0.894 
14 years after 
promotion 
(dropped) 
 
(dropped) 
 
(dropped) 
 
(dropped) 
 
(dropped) 
 
(dropped) 
 
Excellent evaluation 
last year   
-0.480*** 0.162 
    
-0.521** 0.206 
  
Good evaluation last 
year   
0.002 0.110 
    
-0.115 0.144 
  
Proportion of teachers 
in same rank   
-0.003 0.521 -0.499 0.665 
  
-0.608 0.742 
  
Score of all teachers 
but you     
-0.014 0.031 
  
-0.009 0.037 -0.017 0.033 
Education test (relative  
to peers)       
-0.002 0.008 0.031 0.045 
  
Psychology test  
(relative to peers)       
-0.002 0.012 -0.007 0.013 
  
Language test  (relative 
to peers)       
-0.000 0.010 -0.007 0.012 
  
Education level 
(relative to peers)       
0.161 1.457 0.666 1.570 
  
Timing of test (relative 
to peers)       
0.024 0.159 0.023 0.176 0.039 0.146 
Ability quintile 1 
          
-0.000 0.006 
Ability quintile 2 
          
-0.127 0.240 
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Ability quintile 4 
          
0.573** 0.265 
Ability quintile 5 
          
-0.005 0.007 
Constant 2.728*** 0.072 2.673*** 0.185 2.751*** 0.272 2.615*** 0.141 2.993*** 0.332 2.498*** 0.166 
Number of 
observations 
472 351 316 307 282 312 
R2 0.029 0.089 0.045 0.036 0.108 0.082 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3. School Fixed-Effects regression on evaluation scores, Primary 1 
  
No competition 
variables 
Last year's 
evaluation  
Evaluations of all 
teachers but you 
Ability variables 
All competition and 
ability var's 
Ability index 
quintiles 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after promotion -0.072 0.074 -0.047 0.084 -0.015 0.092 0.010 0.129 -0.055 0.143 0.036 0.131 
3 years after promotion -0.030 0.085 -0.090 0.105 -0.055 0.115 -0.013 0.139 -0.085 0.154 -0.013 0.141 
4 years after promotion -0.084 0.094 -0.048 0.125 -0.036 0.135 0.015 0.153 -0.055 0.167 0.012 0.154 
5 years after promotion 0.124 0.102 0.129 0.138 0.163 0.148 0.229 0.161 0.156 0.176 0.204 0.160 
6 years after promotion -0.053 0.113 0.146 0.156 0.116 0.166 0.252 0.180 0.156 0.194 0.163 0.175 
7 years after promotion  -0.047 0.121 0.104 0.170 0.177 0.181 0.335* 0.192 0.276 0.206 0.215 0.186 
8 years after promotion -0.005 0.128 0.230 0.182 0.304 0.192 0.519** 0.206 0.444** 0.219 0.335* 0.195 
9 years after promotion -0.010 0.135 0.258 0.191 0.307 0.202 0.613*** 0.217 0.549** 0.229 0.344* 0.205 
10 years after promotion -0.006 0.147 0.316 0.205 0.422* 0.217 0.670*** 0.233 0.658*** 0.244 0.445** 0.219 
11 years after promotion 0.040 0.163 0.437* 0.225 0.527** 0.238 0.828*** 0.258 0.814*** 0.270 0.569** 0.239 
12 years after promotion -0.094 0.193 0.276 0.263 0.388 0.275 0.758** 0.304 0.718** 0.316 0.431 0.276 
13 years after promotion 0.054 0.210 0.391 0.281 0.493* 0.293 0.867*** 0.324 0.869*** 0.333 0.515* 0.294 
14 years after promotion 0.008 0.266 0.302 0.347 0.254 0.369 0.924** 0.440 1.009** 0.446 0.240 0.369 
15 years after promotion 0.172 0.304 0.377 0.463 0.340 0.511 0.928* 0.530 1.020* 0.563 0.369 0.510 
16 years after promotion -0.037 0.312 0.328 0.486 0.266 0.542 0.809 0.562 0.943 0.606 0.305 0.540 
17 years after promotion -0.199 0.319 0.141 0.496 0.133 0.549 0.608 0.578 0.660 0.618 0.167 0.547 
18 years after promotion -0.235 0.343 0.005 0.518 -0.019 0.570 0.381 0.604 0.451 0.643 0.017 0.569 
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19 years after promotion -0.142 0.416 -0.167 0.590 -0.191 0.638 0.438 0.681 0.463 0.715 -0.146 0.637 
Excellent evaluation last 
year   
-0.334*** 0.067 
    
-0.285*** 0.083 
  
Good evaluation last year 
  
-0.014 0.048 
    
-0.060 0.058 
  
Proportion of teachers in 
same rank   
0.040 0.324 0.034 0.353 
  
0.157 0.400 
  
Score of all teachers but 
you     
-0.019 0.056 
  
-0.020 0.065 -0.022 0.057 
Education test (relative  
to peers)       
0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
  
Psychology test  (relative 
to peers)       
-0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
  
Language test  (relative to 
peers)       
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Education level (relative 
to peers)       
-1.653 1.367 -1.810 1.586 
  
Timing of test (relative to 
peers)       
0.026 0.197 -0.082 0.211 0.022 0.184 
Ability quintile 1 
          
0.005 0.005 
Ability quintile 2 
          
0.197 0.180 
Ability quintile 4 
          
0.454*** 0.137 
Ability quintile 5 
          
0.003 0.005 
Constant 2.646*** 0.092 2.509*** 0.191 2.481*** 0.264 2.285*** 0.139 2.375*** 0.294 2.450*** 0.223 
Number of observations 1,691 1,299 1,221 1,035 967 1,221 
R2 0.017 0.052 0.024 0.037 0.061 0.042 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4. School Fixed-Effects regression on evaluation scores, Primary high 
  
No competition 
variables 
Last year's 
evaluation  
Evaluations of all 
teachers but you 
Ability variables 
All competition and 
ability var's 
Ability index 
quintiles 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after promotion -0.043 0.085 -0.031 0.097 0.054 0.112 -0.404** 0.164 -0.566** 0.229 -0.091 0.166 
3 years after promotion -0.112 0.094 -0.035 0.116 0.024 0.132 -0.479*** 0.185 -0.658*** 0.247 -0.104 0.176 
4 years after promotion -0.198* 0.103 -0.113 0.138 -0.076 0.160 -0.561*** 0.202 -0.763*** 0.270 -0.199 0.196 
5 years after promotion -0.300*** 0.112 -0.199 0.150 -0.085 0.174 -0.426** 0.208 -0.476* 0.279 -0.191 0.204 
6 years after promotion -0.285** 0.123 -0.193 0.166 -0.077 0.191 -0.494** 0.221 -0.621** 0.296 -0.183 0.218 
7 years after promotion  -0.428*** 0.146 -0.259 0.198 -0.144 0.229 -0.482* 0.258 -0.587* 0.344 -0.256 0.252 
8 years after promotion -0.569*** 0.156 -0.318 0.217 -0.162 0.257 -0.591** 0.281 -0.684* 0.380 -0.272 0.276 
9 years after promotion -0.722*** 0.168 -0.347 0.242 -0.142 0.286 -0.633** 0.311 -0.712* 0.426 -0.235 0.304 
10 years after promotion -0.696*** 0.176 -0.412 0.258 -0.211 0.300 -0.576* 0.326 -0.721 0.454 -0.292 0.315 
11 years after promotion -0.887*** 0.184 -0.503* 0.271 -0.251 0.319 -0.770** 0.344 -0.903* 0.476 -0.325 0.328 
12 years after promotion -0.959*** 0.199 -0.562* 0.290 -0.307 0.340 -0.926** 0.360 -1.076** 0.498 -0.365 0.346 
13 years after promotion -1.002*** 0.212 -0.541* 0.301 -0.318 0.349 -0.809** 0.369 -0.973* 0.508 -0.371 0.356 
14 years after promotion -1.353*** 0.337 -0.843** 0.428 -0.485 0.498 -1.130** 0.552 -1.285* 0.665 -0.544 0.502 
15 years after promotion -1.308*** 0.421 -0.767 0.572 -0.414 0.612 -1.110 0.806 -1.250 0.900 -0.460 0.613 
Excellent evaluation last 
year   
-0.178** 0.077 
    
-0.022 0.118 
  
Good evaluation last year 
  
-0.031 0.056 
    
0.035 0.081 
  
Proportion of teachers in 
same rank   
-0.350 0.525 -0.143 0.585 
  
0.646 0.842 
  
Score of all teachers but 
you     
-0.025 0.065 
  
-0.042 0.095 -0.036 0.066 
Education test (relative  to 
peers)       
0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 
  
Psychology test  (relative 
to peers)       
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  
Language test  (relative to 
peers)       
-0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 
  
Education level (relative to 
      
-0.527 2.247 -0.830 2.483 
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peers) 
Timing of test (relative to 
peers)       
-0.986** 0.496 -1.392** 0.636 -0.567 0.422 
Ability quintile 1 
          
0.003 0.006 
Ability quintile 2 
          
0.280 0.313 
Ability quintile 4 
          
0.157 0.227 
Ability quintile 5 
          
-0.008 0.008 
Constant 3.011*** 0.100 2.945*** 0.206 2.801*** 0.330 3.080*** 0.192 3.139*** 0.473 2.906*** 0.289 
Number of observations 1,006 792 658 478 396 658 
R2 0.047 0.023 0.008 0.051 0.077 0.020 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A5. School Fixed-Effects regression on evaluation scores, Middle 3 
  
No competition 
variables 
Last year's 
evaluation  
Evaluations of all 
teachers but you 
Ability variables 
All competition and 
ability var's 
Ability index 
quintiles 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after promotion 0.161 0.108 0.060 0.141 0.065 0.329 -0.158 0.261 -0.189 0.502 0.135 0.391 
3 years after promotion -0.131 0.140 -0.033 0.192 -0.216 0.350 -0.319 0.264 -0.339 0.509 -0.276 0.388 
4 years after promotion -0.222 0.221 -0.473 0.337 -0.525 0.469 -0.710* 0.386 -0.778 0.617 -0.666 0.483 
5 years after promotion -0.675** 0.316 -0.792 0.489 -0.635 0.613 -1.127** 0.538 -1.003 0.767 -0.911 0.586 
6 years after promotion -0.453 0.440 -0.611 0.669 0.183 0.953 -0.909 0.669 -0.109 1.067 -0.940 1.047 
Excellent evaluation last 
year   
-0.352* 0.208 
    
-0.402 0.251 
  
Good evaluation last year 
  
-0.187 0.163 
    
-0.511* 0.281 
  
Proportion of teachers in 
same rank   
0.895 0.779 1.020 0.878 
  
1.137 0.980 
  
Score of all teachers but 
you     
0.014 0.036 
  
0.029 0.048 0.008 0.044 
Education test (relative  
to peers)       
-0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.007 
  
52 
 
Psychology test  (relative 
to peers)       
-0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.006 
  
Language test  (relative to 
peers)       
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  
Education level (relative 
to peers)       
3.051 2.727 1.640 3.032 
  
Timing of test (relative to 
peers)       
0.002 0.168 0.113 0.187 0.118 0.163 
Ability quintile 1 
          
-0.003 0.002 
Ability quintile 2 
          
-0.041 0.264 
Ability quintile 4 
          
0.448 0.419 
Ability quintile 5 
          
0.001 0.003 
Constant 2.646*** 0.081 2.593*** 0.300 2.404*** 0.386 2.857*** 0.174 2.737*** 0.480 2.649*** 0.276 
Number of observations 257 194 174 170 158 170 
R2 0.081 0.132 0.132 0.126 0.222 0.159 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A6. School Fixed-Effects regression on evaluation scores, Middle 2 
  
No competition 
variables 
Last year's evaluation  
Evaluations of all 
teachers but you 
Ability variables 
All competition and 
ability var's 
Ability index 
quintiles 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after promotion 0.056 0.064 0.022 0.072 0.010 0.078 0.171* 0.102 0.151 0.110 0.109 0.103 
3 years after promotion 0.117 0.074 0.133 0.090 0.145 0.097 0.284** 0.111 0.263** 0.120 0.236** 0.113 
4 years after promotion 0.125 0.087 0.241** 0.112 0.257** 0.118 0.343*** 0.124 0.314** 0.132 0.325** 0.126 
5 years after promotion 0.219** 0.108 0.365** 0.143 0.380** 0.150 0.403*** 0.151 0.345** 0.158 0.431*** 0.155 
6 years after promotion 0.307** 0.121 0.448*** 0.164 0.432** 0.173 0.380** 0.174 0.348* 0.180 0.464*** 0.176 
7 years after promotion  0.329** 0.134 0.434** 0.184 0.447** 0.193 0.346* 0.191 0.323 0.197 0.447** 0.196 
8 years after promotion 0.268* 0.154 0.411* 0.216 0.521** 0.230 0.341 0.225 0.408* 0.233 0.498** 0.232 
9 years after promotion 0.193 0.164 0.370 0.235 0.512** 0.250 0.220 0.244 0.287 0.254 0.478* 0.252 
10 years after promotion 0.241 0.177 0.411 0.252 0.635** 0.267 0.194 0.265 0.292 0.276 0.583** 0.269 
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11 years after promotion 0.297 0.196 0.415 0.277 0.595** 0.294 0.256 0.292 0.354 0.303 0.474 0.302 
12 years after promotion 0.204 0.215 0.367 0.305 0.525 0.324 0.020 0.319 0.165 0.331 0.404 0.334 
13 years after promotion 0.191 0.244 0.271 0.339 0.387 0.360 -0.188 0.357 -0.067 0.371 0.266 0.368 
14 years after promotion 0.281 0.277 0.304 0.372 0.417 0.402 -0.066 0.392 -0.065 0.415 0.264 0.412 
15 years after promotion 0.292 0.368 0.246 0.453 0.237 0.537 -0.281 0.487 -0.262 0.534 0.118 0.540 
Excellent evaluation last 
year   
-0.295*** 0.081 
    
-0.315*** 0.088 
  
Good evaluation last year 
  
-0.065 0.057 
    
-0.083 0.063 
  
Proportion of teachers in 
same rank   
0.145 0.541 -0.050 0.568 
  
-0.362 0.609 
  
Score of all teachers but 
you     
0.033 0.048 
  
0.078 0.056 0.032 0.049 
Education test (relative  
to peers)       
-0.003 0.005 -0.009 0.006 
  
Psychology test  (relative 
to peers)       
0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 
  
Language test  (relative to 
peers)       
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  
Education level (relative 
to peers)       
-2.168** 1.056 -1.867* 1.134 
  
Timing of test (relative to 
peers)       
0.180 0.122 0.185 0.132 0.187* 0.111 
Ability quintile 1 
          
-0.006 0.004 
Ability quintile 2 
          
0.103 0.181 
Ability quintile 4 
          
0.076 0.111 
Ability quintile 5 
          
0.001 0.006 
Constant 2.404*** 0.077 2.330*** 0.231 2.230*** 0.282 2.354*** 0.112 2.357*** 0.302 2.188*** 0.172 
Number of observations 1,259 1,000 936 890 841 936 
R2 0.012 0.042 0.023 0.048 0.075 0.034 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7. School Fixed-Effects regression on evaluation scores, Middle 1 
  
No competition 
variables 
Last year's 
evaluation  
Evaluations of all 
teachers but you 
Ability variables 
All competition and 
ability var's 
Ability index 
quintiles 
  coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se 
2 years after promotion -0.068 0.083 0.002 0.101 -0.022 0.102 0.181 0.124 0.099 0.158 0.023 0.105 
3 years after promotion -0.100 0.093 -0.029 0.130 -0.151 0.133 0.179 0.139 0.018 0.186 -0.077 0.125 
4 years after promotion -0.019 0.106 0.095 0.168 -0.016 0.170 0.208 0.160 0.089 0.217 0.085 0.146 
5 years after promotion -0.227* 0.122 -0.183 0.204 -0.288 0.209 0.064 0.183 -0.008 0.275 -0.157 0.170 
6 years after promotion -0.414*** 0.140 -0.357 0.239 -0.453* 0.243 0.011 0.222 -0.038 0.322 -0.292 0.195 
7 years after promotion  -0.244 0.164 -0.019 0.282 -0.098 0.284 0.397 0.269 0.403 0.375 0.076 0.231 
8 years after promotion -0.373** 0.179 -0.261 0.316 -0.387 0.318 0.111 0.306 0.116 0.419 -0.173 0.256 
9 years after promotion -0.300 0.202 -0.174 0.354 -0.205 0.357 0.058 0.336 0.243 0.459 0.064 0.292 
10 years after promotion -0.230 0.223 -0.238 0.398 -0.404 0.407 0.195 0.367 0.198 0.512 -0.100 0.322 
11 years after promotion -0.164 0.261 -0.147 0.480 -0.397 0.488 0.175 0.443 0.199 0.594 -0.065 0.387 
12 years after promotion -0.190 0.280 -0.218 0.514 -0.452 0.520 0.165 0.484 0.241 0.635 -0.115 0.420 
13 years after promotion -0.346 0.302 -0.336 0.563 -0.620 0.570 0.040 0.507 0.080 0.687 -0.229 0.445 
14 years after promotion -0.132 0.367 -0.111 0.637 -0.366 0.655 -0.023 0.600 0.124 0.814 0.044 0.525 
Excellent evaluation last 
year   
-0.133 0.099 
    
-0.090 0.118 
  
Good evaluation last year 
  
-0.022 0.076 
    
-0.064 0.088 
  
Proportion of teachers in 
same rank   
0.091 0.702 0.559 0.716 
  
-0.035 0.889 
  
Score of all teachers but 
you     
0.197* 0.103 
  
0.191 0.140 0.197* 0.104 
Education test (relative  
to peers)       
-0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.009 
  
Psychology test  (relative 
to peers)       
0.010*** 0.004 0.010*** 0.004 
  
Language test  (relative to 
peers)       
-0.007 0.004 -0.007* 0.004 
  
Education level (relative 
to peers)       
-2.039 1.411 -0.716 1.554 
  
Timing of test (relative to 
      
0.204 0.138 0.155 0.148 0.023 0.081 
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peers) 
Ability quintile 1 
          
-0.009 0.008 
Ability quintile 2 
          
-0.002 0.286 
Ability quintile 4 
          
-0.189 0.153 
Ability quintile 5 
          
0.000 0.002 
Constant 2.706*** 0.092 2.620*** 0.162 2.042*** 0.348 2.433*** 0.138 2.039*** 0.466 2.078*** 0.335 
Number of observations 687 555 525 397 373 525 
R2 0.033 0.062 0.081 0.102 0.107 0.089 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A8.  Regression of proportion of teachers variable, pooled sample 
  Dummies interacted with teachers 
  coef se 
Primary 2 * teachers * 2 years after promotion 0.280 0.282 
Primary 2 * teachers * 3 years after promotion 0.221 0.349 
Primary 2 * teachers * 4 years after promotion 0.127 0.480 
Primary 2 * teachers * 5 years after promotion -1.602 1.072 
Primary 2 * teachers * 6 years after promotion 0.070 1.668 
Primary 2 * teachers * 7 years after promotion -0.386 0.849 
Primary 2 * teachers * 8 to 13 years after promotion -0.510 0.760 
Primary 2 * teachers * 14 years after promotion 0.686 0.697 
Primary 1 * teachers * 2 years after promotion -0.387** 0.168 
Primary 1 * teachers * 3 years after promotion -0.467*** 0.167 
Primary 1 * teachers * 4 years after promotion -0.535*** 0.182 
Primary 1 * teachers * 5 years after promotion -0.047 0.174 
Primary 1 * teachers * 6 years after promotion -0.311* 0.181 
Primary 1 * teachers * 7 years after promotion -0.132 0.170 
Primary 1 * teachers * 8 years after promotion 0.140 0.168 
Primary 1 * teachers * 9 years after promotion 0.275* 0.163 
Primary 1 * teachers * 10 years after promotion 0.227 0.215 
Primary 1 * teachers * 11 years after promotion 0.263 0.217 
Primary 1 * teachers * 12 years after promotion -0.005 0.279 
Primary 1 * teachers * 13 years after promotion 0.274 0.315 
Primary 1 * teachers * 14 years after promotion 1.172** 0.597 
Primary 1 * teachers * 15 years after promotion 0.843* 0.489 
Primary 1 * teachers * 16 years after promotion -0.349 0.383 
Primary 1 * teachers * 17 years after promotion -0.158 0.381 
Primary 1 * teachers * 18 years after promotion -0.508 0.404 
Primary 1 * teachers * 19 years after promotion 0.501 0.549 
Primary high * teachers * 2 years after promotion -0.055 0.319 
Primary high * teachers * 3 years after promotion -0.245 0.322 
Primary high * teachers * 4 years after promotion -0.303 0.295 
Primary high * teachers * 5 years after promotion 0.052 0.306 
Primary high * teachers * 6 years after promotion -0.094 0.339 
Primary high * teachers * 7 years after promotion -0.071 0.462 
Primary high * teachers * 8 years after promotion -0.516 0.518 
Primary high * teachers * 9 years after promotion -0.452 0.529 
Primary high * teachers * 10 years after promotion -0.057 0.517 
Primary high * teachers * 11 years after promotion -0.379 0.366 
Primary high * teachers * 12 years after promotion -0.957** 0.408 
Primary high * teachers * 13 years after promotion -0.779* 0.426 
Primary high * teachers * 14 years after promotion -1.296 1.252 
Primary high * teachers * 15 years after promotion -0.610 0.775 
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Middle 3 * teachers * 2 years after promotion 0.643** 0.309 
Middle 3 * teachers * 3 years after promotion -0.358 0.511 
Middle 3 * teachers * 4 years after promotion 1.178 0.756 
Middle 3 * teachers * 5 years after promotion -0.712 1.179 
Middle 3 * teachers * 6 years after promotion 0.389 2.006 
Middle 2 * teachers * 2 years after promotion -0.017 0.162 
Middle 2 * teachers * 3 years after promotion -0.038 0.168 
Middle 2 * teachers * 4 years after promotion 0.090 0.182 
Middle 2 * teachers * 5 years after promotion -0.003 0.214 
Middle 2 * teachers * 6 years after promotion 0.143 0.223 
Middle 2 * teachers * 7 years after promotion 0.099 0.217 
Middle 2 * teachers * 8 years after promotion 0.099 0.248 
Middle 2 * teachers * 9 years after promotion -0.009 0.246 
Middle 2 * teachers * 10 years after promotion -0.146 0.248 
Middle 2 * teachers * 11 years after promotion -0.219 0.276 
Middle 2 * teachers * 12 years after promotion -0.298 0.269 
Middle 2 * teachers * 13 years after promotion -0.418 0.335 
Middle 2 * teachers * 14 years after promotion -0.406 0.459 
Middle 2 * teachers * 15 years after promotion -1.292* 0.709 
Middle 1 * teachers * 2 years after promotion -0.144 0.279 
Middle 1 * teachers * 3 years after promotion -0.072 0.319 
Middle 1 * teachers * 4 years after promotion 0.310 0.329 
Middle 1 * teachers * 5 years after promotion -0.426 0.337 
Middle 1 * teachers * 6 years after promotion -0.344 0.410 
Middle 1 * teachers * 7 years after promotion 0.111 0.563 
Middle 1 * teachers * 8 years after promotion 0.587 0.555 
Middle 1 * teachers * 9 years after promotion 1.334** 0.557 
Middle 1 * teachers * 10 years after promotion 1.743*** 0.570 
Middle 1 * teachers * 11 years after promotion 0.907 0.733 
Middle 1 * teachers * 12 years after promotion 0.960 0.847 
Middle 1 * teachers * 13 years after promotion -0.532 0.773 
Middle 1 * teachers * 14 years after promotion -0.011 1.140 
Middle high * teachers * 2 years after promotion 15.294 44.837 
Middle high * teachers * 3 years after promotion 15.294 44.837 
Middle high * teachers * 4 years after promotion 15.294 44.837 
Education test (relative to others) 0.001 0.000 
Psychology test (relative to others) 0.000 0.001 
Language test (relative to others) 0.000 0.000 
Years of education (relative to others) -0.209 0.140 
Timing of tests (relative to others) 0.044* 0.025 
Constant 2.607*** 0.020 
Number of observations 3,864 
R2 0.031 
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